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The Long Road to Independence 
Regional and Separatist Movements in Europe 
 
Sebastian Delogu 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the current situation of separatist and secessionist movements 
in the EU area, taking into consideration both political parties and regional national 
movements. It seeks to analyse the possible similarities between the different 
movements by focussing on the characteristics they have in common and those that 
most differ from each other in order to understand whether or not it is possible to 
point to a more general trend followed by the different movements. The thesis first 
examines what scholars have written about the issue, and then it moves to a general 
overview of the EU political panorama by listing the major movements and political 
parties that seek a higher degree of self-autonomy or the radical solution: secession. 
It then presents three study cases from the list, two, Catalonia and Scotland, that are 
perfect examples of separatist movements, and the third, Trieste, which represents a 
very particular case far from the established standard. The thesis shows that, despite 
the fact that each case possesses specific characteristics that distinguish it from the 
others, it is possible to generalise to a certain level by categorizing a range of 
policies undertaken by different movements in specific key areas (education, 
economics, regional self-awareness, and promotion of national history).  
The research presented reveals that the present political movements have interests in 
different areas and wish for more independence to very different degrees: starting 
from cases in which greater autonomy is sought to cases in which a total separation 
from the central government is the desired goal. Nevertheless it is possible to find 
common areas shared by most of the separatist movements. The upcoming 
referendum for independence in Scotland and Catalonia, as well as the growing 
interest in this new wave of regionalism, leads to the conclusion that separatist 
movements will pose a serious challenge to the EU as well as to the central 
governments in the country in which they are located in as, regardless of the final 
outcome, it will generate legal precedents that could give rise to a domino effect of 
greater autonomy and/or secession.  
Keywords: Secession, European Union, Regional Nationalism, Independence, 
Autonomy, Self-government.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Overview of the Thesis 
 
Introduction – 1.1 
This research will seek to analyse the nature of independence movements, or 
separatist movements, and their increasing spread and seeming revitalization through 
Europe. It is important to understand why in this moment in history we are 
witnessing what seems to be a marked increase in the number and strength of 
independence movements and which factors are playing a role in the political arena.  
The thesis will try to present a possible definition of what an independence 
movement is and which characteristics it must possess, as well as which political, 
social, linguistic, and economic policies it undertakes in order to pursue its goals. It 
is worth mentioning at this point that the thesis will try to give a possible definition, 
among others and in the broad sense of the term, that will encompass and frame the 
different factors that most often are part of modern independence movements. The 
research will be based on pertinent literature on the topic, as well as examples taken 
from present and past independence movements.  
A very interesting piece by Siobhan Harty1 provides a great theoretical frame 
to the topic by analyzing the institutional aspects of nation-building and political 
legitimacy towards sub-state nationalistic movements which seek to preserve and 
promote the regional/local culture. Some are looking for more independence from 
the central governments or the recognition of special rights and benefits; others’ 
                                                           
1Harty, Siobhan. “The Institutional Foundations of Substate National Movements”. Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 33, No 2 (Jan, 2001), pp. 191-210. Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University 
of New York. 
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objective is a more clear and distinct separation from the State through and 
independence process. In addition to this the Catalan, among others, will be 
discussed, given the amount of literature on the Catalonian independence movement 
and the fact that it can be regarded as one of the best organized, mature, and clear 
example of modern independence movements in Europe.  
Although it is possible to encounter independence movements all over the 
globe, this paper will discuss mostly those located within Europe. This choice was 
made taking into consideration the present democratic political contexts under which 
the diverse movements will be discussed. Many interesting cases (the case of Tibet 
and China; the push for Kurdish independence in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran; or 
Chechnya in Russia are just possible examples) which are geographically not in 
Europe would make great research topics, but this research will deal with 
independence movements within a democratic-liberal context, to different degrees 
and types. In addition, the thesis will focus only on countries in the EU as 
membership in this supranational institution structures politics in ways that are 
distinct from other world regions.  
The case of Turkey—and its absence in the thesis—is a bit out of the ordinary 
and should be explained. Although in many classifications Turkey is placed within 
Europe, there are also classifications that put it outside of Europe. Most important for 
this thesis, Turkey is not a member of the European Union and furthermore, 
geographically speaking only 3% of its territory is in Europe.2 Thus, perhaps the 
term transcontinental better describe the situation of Turkey.  Furthermore the 
Turkish government did not undertake democratic means to solve the controversies 
                                                           
2Atlante Online, geography of Turkey, retrieved Nov 24th from 
http://em.atlante.unimondo.org/Paesi/Asia/Asia-occidentale/Turchia/(livello)/conosci  
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when dealing with its issues with minorities and separatist movements. Turkey itself 
defines its territories located west of the Bosporus as Anatolian, as opposed to 
European.  The lack of a democratic or semi-democratic state, as opposed to a 
regime, as well as the absence of Turkish membership in the EU, places these cases 
under a different category.  
The last part of the thesis will try to underline common characteristics or 
factors among the different movements, and address whether it is possible to 
organize them by similar factors. Observations reflecting the data will be presented 
and organised according to geographical, economic, socio-linguistic and historical 
factors, as well as other considerations that do not match this division. 
The conclusion will wrap up the discussion, indulging on the concept of self-
determination and posing questions on the future of this new wave of regionalism. 
 
Research Questions – 1.2 
The thesis sets out to ask: Is it possible to find a common set of characteristics and 
factors that are shared by most of the separatist movements in Europe or that at least 
are essential to define a movement as pro-independence/separatist? If this is the case, 
can they be categorized according to their most prominent and important 
characteristics (for instance, ethnicity driven nationalism, economic driven 
nationalism etc.), keeping in mind that a some percentage of all these factors is 
always present?  
Most of the literature about the topic focuses on single case studies but does 
not tackle the issue at a general level. Given the great number of differences between 
each single case study criticising this approach should not be considered as incorrect, 
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nevertheless it is possible to formulate general assumptions by confronting a 
significant number of case studies.  
Further research, presented in the following chapters, shows that it is not 
possible to give precise and exclusive answers to the research questions presented 
here, as often happens to be the case in most social science disciplines. On the other 
hand it is possible to engage in critical and constructive discussions over several 
aspects that are particularly inherent to the topic. 
 
 
Methodology – 1.3 
Different types of sources will be used in order to collect different types of data. 
For the theoretical structure of the thesis, a review of academic articles and 
books will be privileged. The main aim of the literature review is to analyse, discuss, 
and report what has been written on the topic of regional nationalism, separatist 
movements, and independence movements in general. This is necessary in order to 
provide a solid base for the research at a general and more conceptual level.  
In addition to the scholarly articles, I will also look into the official and 
unofficial internet sites of separatist and independence movements. Some of them 
are very official and institutionalized, while others are more informal as blogs, 
internet forums, or unofficial gatherings and clubs that promote regional nationalism, 
separatist ideas and discuss possible politics that encompass cultural, social, 
linguistic, economic and political issues. 
Furthermore analysis of polls related to the topic will be included, to grasp an 
idea of what is the general opinion of the citizens of the area in which the movement 
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is located and operates about any possible regional secession.  
Last but still important, sources such as online newspapers, television, social 
media, as well as non-internet based means of information will be taken into 
consideration in order to collect the most recent and fresh data as possible. The 
framing of the last series of events regarding Scotland and Catalonia, as well as 
many others, will require verifying the newest polls, political speeches, and policies 
of any kind which have been undertaken in the last period of time. The data collected 
will be both of general interest and from the specific separatist movements that will 
be nominated, discussed and analyzed within the paper. 
 
Map of Thesis – 1.4 
At this stage it is worth providing a map of the thesis that should hopefully 
convey a general idea of how the thesis will be structured.  
The introductory chapter includes some short information related to the main 
findings, the core questions of the paper as well as hints of theoretical and empirical 
data further discussed at a second stage. The discussion is divided between the 
theoretical and the empirical contents.  
The second chapter deals with the concepts of independence, separatism, 
nationalism, regionalism and identity, and it tries to define what a separatist 
movement is by looking at the literature on the topic and at the same time as the 
characteristics of existing movements located in Europe. In addition to this, in the 
third chapter, I will try to list or to name all the separatist movements located in 
Europe, but it is important to notice that the list of movements will be influenced by 
the set of characteristics and factors that are tackled in the theoretical part. In other 
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words some movements may be left out because they do not possess the minimum 
criteria to be defined as so, according to the literature. The empirical part, chapter 
four, rather discusses real examples of policies and frames the characteristics 
mentioned above into study cases taken from European regional national 
movements. 
The following section, chapter five, highlights common features, 
characteristics, goals and typical activities undertaken by the different movements, 
discussing a possible subdivision or categorization according to the analysis. 
The conclusion, included in the same chapter, discusses the findings, and will 
wrap up the contents as well as the main achievements of the research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction – 2.1 
This chapter of the thesis proposes a theoretical framework for the themes that 
will be discussed more in-depth in the next chapters. Before entering more detailed 
study cases and examples from EU countries, it is necessary to have a grasp of what 
has been said by academics and researchers on the topic. Proposing a precise and 
universal definition of what constitutes a separatist movement is critical for our 
purposes, but unfortunately despite many previous attempts, it is not possible to 
generate a single definition that encompasses the vast multitude of cases all over the 
globe. Instead of trying to add another incomplete definition, it is better to focus on 
the different aspects that are embedded in the topic of separatism and then focus the 
present study on Europe. Given the fact that it is not possible to deal with the subject 
without embracing themes such as nationalism, ethnicity, self-determination and 
language policies, this chapter will present partial definitions and approaches of 
scholars who engaged the subject.  
An elucidation of the terminology is necessary to clarify any future 
misunderstanding. The words used to define concepts related to nationality and 
ethnicity are often vague and used interchangeably by non-scholars. If we take a look 
at newspaper or in the media, despite some necessary clarifications, a lot of the 
terminology is often misused when referring to the topic. In this chapter, definitions 
and conceptions of different scholars will be presented, and the use of the 
terminology could be differentiated for each single case. 
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Although a large combination of themes and topics are related, in a direct or 
indirect way, to separatism, for the purpose of this thesis only the main concept will 
be discussed in this chapter, so that a simple and practical scholarly framework will 
be provided. The four main points will revert around the concept of self-
determination, nationalism and ethnicity, language policies and possible approaches 
to separatist movements. 
The theoretical framework will engage with important concepts that are related 
to those of regionalism and separatism, in order to gather different views about the 
topic. These concepts will be then used to compile a chart of modern regional and 
separatist movements in Europe, and to define which movements are and which ones 
are not separatist to varying degrees. The presence, in different forms, of the 
concepts that are discussed in the theoretical chapter, constitutes significant 
indicators that are useful, for the purpose of this research, to better identify and 
distinguish regional and secessionist movements. 
 
The Concept of Self-Determination – 2.2 
The notion of self-determination is fundamental to dealing with the topic of 
separatism. The right of self-determination is one of the core principles on which the 
claims of separatism and independence is often made, and it also constitutes the legal 
ground on which these claims can be formulated and, when successful, implemented. 
Cass (1998) discusses how the term self-determination has been undergoing a 
constant modification in the international law sphere. Two new terms, separatism 
and democratic entitlement, have been adopted because considered better to capture 
present realities. Separatism reflects the post Cold-War fragmentation of the Eastern 
European block and the Baltic area with the sub-sequential enlargement of the 
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European Union. Democratic entitlement places emphasis on the sovereignty of a 
group of individuals through participation in the policy making. The modern 
conception of self-determination encompasses very diverse aspects and disciplines, 
hence a combination of state practice, self-determination theory and relations 
between international and municipal law play a role in the modern definition of the 
topic.  
Cass underlines how self-determination is becoming constitutionalized and 
how this new practice is not only new, but rather revolutionary. The development of 
self-determination laws seldom occurs outside of the state. Still, even in the most 
extreme and violent cases of self determination claimed by a group must be enacted 
through the state machinery and bureaucracy. Any failure in doing this will most 
likely mark the claims as illegal and unconstitutional or, worse, terrorist. This new 
constitutionalized nature of self-determination is often considered as what in modern 
terms is regarded as desire for sovereignty, which is constantly being defined, 
expanded and articulated by nation states.  As a consequence, the constitutional legal 
systems of some states are now managing to recognize some of the bundle of rights 
entailed by a growing awareness of self-determination. Cass here defines 
constitutionalization as the internal legal integration of particular attributes of self-
determination so that the concept itself will become a part of the constitutional fabric 
of the state. In simpler words this means that a lot of the self-determination 
principles and claims that are now taken for granted and recognized as essential in 
any modern accredited democracy, were not implemented and sometimes not even 
mentioned, in the past. If at the present time, the right to possess a distinct culture or 
religion different from the majority is considered a basic human right, it is the result 
of a long process of what Cass defines as constitutionalization of self-determination. 
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This change must be acknowledged among the new political practices. This new 
trend recognises the interconnectivity of international and constitutional law, by 
taking into account democratic theory and accords with subtle yet fundamental 
changes in the state practice.  
Dahbour (2001) engages with the idea of self-determination arguing the 
important role played by this concept in recent debates related to the ethics of 
international relations. He presents from a historical point of view the importance of 
the demands for statehood of European nationalities during the XIX century, 
followed by the national liberation movements in the ex-colonies during the XX 
century until the secessionist and separatist national movements at the present time. 
Furthermore Dahbour discusses an interesting model of interpretation of the 
principle of self-determination, based on three different aspects: democratic, national 
and regional. 
By democratic self-determination the author refers to the right of self-rule by 
the people located on an already existing territory. This can be easily applied to the 
historical anti-colonial movements and their subsequent liberation struggles for self-
determination. The term national self-determination is applied to the advocacy of 
separate statehood for national groups, regardless of whether these groups are 
located on and a territory defined by internationally recognized boundaries or not. 
This is in particular the aspect which is more related to the core topic of this research 
and which tries to provide a theoretical definition to separatist movements. By 
regional self-determination Dahbour refers to contemporary movements of groups of 
people whose lifestyle does not abide to the needs and tendencies of the mainstream 
market. This section deals with cases such as the indigenous people of America or, to 
a certain extent, the case of Tibet and its inhabitants. The author then builds a 
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continuum between the definitions presented above and the current situation by 
rephrasing the concept into the notion that no groups or categories can be excluded 
from the same degree of political participation within a democratic state.  
When these pre-conditions are not respected, it is the often the case that some 
national movements will arise and make claims based on the right of self-
determination discussed above. For the main purpose of this research the failed 
realization of these pre-conditions could be verified on real separatist movements 
located in Europe, to see whether or not this condition is mandatory or, on the other 
hand, it is just one of the conditions that facilitate the rise of national separatism.  
Dahbour also discusses what he defines as the right to culture of different 
groups. Given the fact that national self-determination is the idea that nationalities 
may rightfully determine the boundaries, membership, culture and political status of 
their own communities, asserting a right to statehood, the author pointes out how this 
right to maintain, preserve and promote their culture usually requires specific 
conditions to be fulfilled. First of all the survival of the culture cannot be assured 
without the existence of a state. The author here quotes Kymlicka (1995) by 
asserting that those cultures that are able to escape marginalization are increasingly 
“societal” cultures. In addition to this, institutions and the continuous exposition of 
the culture on a large scale must be provided in order for this culture to be fully 
enjoyable.  This is an interesting claim, especially if we consider the importance 
placed here on enjoyment of one’s culture. This is why the right to a state follows 
from the interest that a group of individuals have in living with and within a culture 
of their choice.  
The author concludes explaining how, in his views, when national cultures are 
suppressed or persecuted the measures to denounce and defend against these abuses 
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are just those applicable to any other cases of human rights violation, specifying how 
no separate principle of national self-determination is warranted. Dahbour also 
makes use of the term cultural genocide to indicate the forcible suppression of a 
group’s cultural practices. He then states that secession would become an option in 
cases in which there is no recognition what he defined, using Buchanan’s conception 
(1991), as discriminatory retribution. This concept can be easily applied to two 
different contexts: one regarding indigenous people, or more in general any group of 
people, who make different use of resources (American Indians or Tibetans for 
instance). The second concerns regions of a country subject to economic exploitation 
that disrupts the ability of such regions to sustain a way of life distinct from that of 
the rest of a country.  
Therefore, for this thesis, when dealing with the concept of self-determination 
emphasis will be placed on the right that a group of individuals possess to be part of 
a state in which they recognize as their own. This also includes the right to actively 
participate in political life, as well as the right to ask for secession from the state if 
specific criteria are matched. 
 
 
Nationalism & Ethnicity – 2.3 
Nationalism and Ethnicity are two of the most complicated concepts to present 
with a single and universally accepted definition. As previously explained, the two 
concepts are often considered interchangeable although many scholars spent many 
pages in trying to define a clear line of demarcation between them. Furthermore the 
two concepts are tightly connected to separatism and independence claims, so that it 
is not possible to effectively engage in the topic without dealing with the notions of 
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nationalism and ethnicity. Needless to say, entire dissertations could be written on 
only one of the two concepts and yet there would be more to be said. The next 
discussion is not meant to propose an extensive analysis of the two, but rather to 
present a theoretical infrastructure to support the main topic of this paper.  
Harty (2001) contributes substantially to the research topic. She argues how 
national culture is essential for a state to consolidate its political legitimacy as well 
as to facilitate the business of governing. She underlines how there is an inescapable 
linkage between national culture and institutions since its reproduction is their main 
task on a daily basis and on a large scale. Gellner (1983) similarly argues that the 
roots of modern nationalism lie in the importance of culture for industrial society. 
Harty agrees with this and presents at a conceptual level how this is happening. First 
of all it is important to point out that national culture provides some of the key tools 
that allow the national of a country to benefit from social and economic 
opportunities. The term tools is referring here to the set of language, education, 
culture and customs that citizens of the same state share and must use in order to 
correctly interact with each other, on a personal level, at with the institutions, on a 
public level. Furthermore the existence of a rather homogeneous background, which 
is usually reinforced by the central government with pacific and sometimes violent 
means, assures a higher level of acceptance of the laws and regulation imposed by 
the central government, as well as a perception of the political system to be fair. In 
the unlucky case, exactly what this paper will deal with, in which citizens of the 
same country possess distinct cultural backgrounds, the state will most probably try 
to impose its own institutions over any rival ones so that it can enforce a natural 
culture (recognized, sponsored and promoted by the state). In other words, when the 
national culture is not fully inclusive and being part of a minority culture leads to 
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economic and social discrimination, citizens’ compliance will not be present, hence 
rules will have to spend coercive means, or more democratic or semi-democratic, to 
enforce it. 
Hobsbawm (1992) engages the theme of nationalism and ethnicity, taking into 
consideration the present European panorama. He first underlines how the notion of 
nationalism, hence the nation itself, is made by its past. The motivation that pushes, 
and justify, struggles between nations over territories, resources and demands for 
extensive sovereignty possesses an historical component that can be identified as 
past. According to Ernest Renan (1882) history plays a great role in nation formation 
processes but the progress of historical study is often dangerous to a nationality. 
Hobsbawm paraphrases this concept by explaining how it is extremely likely that 
historians who write about ethnicity and nationalism cannot but make a politically 
explosive intervention. Furthermore Hobsbawm states how every separatist 
movement in Europe is based on ethnicity, which could be linguistic or not, that is to 
say on the assumption of a difference between we and them. 
Regardless of how ethnicity and nationalism are often wrongly considered 
interchangeable, the author spends time in defining a clear boundary between the 
two. He underlines how nationalism can be considered as a political program 
regarding different nation-states. Groups defined as nations have the right to form 
territorial states of the kind that have become standardized since the French 
revolution. This means that in practice nation-states can exercises sovereign control 
over a continuous stretch of territory with clearly defined borders, which is inhabited 
by a homogeneous (as much as possible) population that constitutes its essential 
body of citizens. The author criticizes the fact that the so called principle of 
nationality assumes that the nation is given without really providing a 
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comprehensive and universal definition of what a nation is. He discusses how the 
concept of nation is somehow artificially constructed, and there is no such thing as a 
primordial concept, nor a standardized one. Hobsbawn presented a famous statement 
of Massimo D’Azeglio about the creation of the Italian state: “we have made Italy, 
now we have to make Italians”, which clearly exemplifies the lack of any previous 
form of, to use his words, Italian-ness. The inhabitants of the peninsula not only had 
all sorts of identities, and languages, and after the unification (which was quite 
bloody and violent) a state came into existence over their heads.  
Ethnicity on the other hand cannot be considered a political program as it is not 
a programmatic nor a political concept, although it may be associated with political 
agendas, including nationalist and separatist ones. It is often the case that nationalism 
needs ethnicity to be historically supported in its claims and statements, and nothing 
better than ethnicity could fulfil this crucial lack. The author emphasises how 
ethnicity, unlike nationalism, is a readily definable way of conveying a real sense of 
group identity by linking the member of the group in stressing their differences with 
those who are not part of it. 
Calhoun (1993) engages with the historical roots of nationalism. He presents 
several hypothesis of the first forms of nationalism, that are part of an ongoing 
discussion by scholars: the British rebellion against monarchy (Kohn 1944, 
Greenfeld 1991, 1992); the eighteen century struggles of New World elites against 
Iberian colonialism (Anderson 1991); the French revolution of 1789 (Alter 1989, 
Best 1988); and the German reaction to the revolution and to German disunity 
(Kedourie 1960, Breuilly 1982). Kedourine (1960) sums up the concept of 
nationalism by stating that humanity is naturally divided into nations which are their 
selves known by certain characteristics that can be ascertained, and the only 
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legitimate type of government is national self-government. Despite of the 
disagreements over many different theories, academicians agree on setting 1815 as a 
date in which some forms of nationalism were already present. 
Calhoun considers the possibility that the concept of nation is often used in 
rhetorical ways in order to make political claims and to manipulate mass sentiments 
in pursuit of power. Furthermore he seeks whether or not a possible prior existence 
of ethnicity would explain nationhood, exploring links between the latter and 
nationalism. As previously discussed, nationalism and corollary terms have proven 
very hard to define in a precise way, and it is important to consider that any 
definition will legitimate some claims while delegitimizing others. Nation and 
nationalism are among those terms used to refer not to any clearly definable set, and 
because of the instability of their definitions they are highly contestable. The authors 
recognise the flaw in the elements on which these definitions are usually based on: 
qualities which putative nations or nationalist movements share with admitted non-
nations (for instance with ethnicity); or qualities which are not clearly present in all 
recognized members of the set of nations (such as the ambition to control a state for 
example). 
The expansion of the direct rule throughout Europe caused the daily routine of 
Europeans to change according to which sovereign state they reside in. Each state 
imposed a national language, a national education system, a national military service 
and a set of others standardised national structures. Tilly (1990) summarises this 
concept pointing out how life was homogenised within states and heterogenised 
among states: single individuals, regardless of which state they belonged to, became 
restrained by the national rule; and all states set different structure, from each other, 
and institutions to influence the life of their citizens. In other words, people were 
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associated in being citizens, but they differed from each other according to the single 
regulations of the country they became nationals of. 
Calhoun concludes that it is impossible to dissociate nationalism entirely from 
ethnicity, and that similarly it is not possible to explain nationalism as a direct and 
simple continuation from ethnicity. Nationalism stands as the preeminent rhetoric 
used to demarcate political communities, claim rights and self-determination. On the 
other hand ethnic similarities, as opposed to nationalist ones, are often claimed 
where groups do not seek national autonomy but rather a formal recognition internal, 
or sometimes cross-cutting, to the nation state boundaries.  
Hah and Martin (1975) provide a different approach to the theme of 
Nationalism by discussing definitions of other scholars. Sauvigny (1970) found the 
term used in 1836, and defined it as a type of national sentiment, using a very 
Romantic connotation of the term. The authors stress how nationalism used to be 
considered as a communal spirit which infused a group of individuals with 
fellowship or rather as a demonic spirit which could only be controlled by the 
aggrandisement of the national power. Kedourie (1971) defined nationalism as a 
doctrine that held that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are 
known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only 
legitimate type of government is national self-government. The authors criticise 
these definitions as being too general and not being able to specify the cases in which 
the term nationalism can be applied to. The authors’ definition considers nationalism 
as ensemble of organizationally heightened and articulated groups demands directed 
towards securing control of the distributive system in a society.  
The authors provided some conditions for the development of nationalism 
according to their definition. The first condition is that demands must be 
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organizationally heightened, and according to Fisherman’s (1972) approach a degree 
of organization among involved groups is essential for goal-directed activity. He 
suggests that nationalism is a structure response to common social influences. The 
second point is that nationalism is composed by articulated demands, rather than 
feelings of patriotism, and because of this it is observable and valuable to a certain 
extent. The third assumption is that groups are the real carriers of these demands of 
nationalism, rather then developing on their own within the society. The fourth 
condition is that these demands are for the control of the distributive system in a 
society meaning that the output will likely to be unbalanced between different groups 
within the same society. It is also worth mentioning that the character of nationalist 
groups will vary among societies with different principles of distribution, hence it is 
not possible to find a single common denominator to build a universal model capable 
to analyse the nature of the distribution discussed above.  
Hah and Martin (1975) discuss some interesting integration theories of 
nationalism whose insights could be useful for the main topic of this paper. The idea 
of integration possess many different connotations but when dealing with literature 
on nationalism it can be regarded as the process of merging culturally and socially 
discrete groups into a single territorial unit with the subsequent creation of a national 
identity within that unit. Claude (1955) propose a definition linked to the concept of 
assimilationism. For Claude assimilation requires that minorities consent to 
abandoning their ethnic, cultural and linguistic characteristics which constitute the 
core of the differentiation between them and the national majorities they coexist 
with. Hence minorities are expected to merge into nationally uniformed communities 
with the majority, which on the other hand is expected to facilitate and stimulate this 
merger as much as possible. Needless to say, this concept clashes with some modern 
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principles of minority rights, built to ensure the cultural, linguistic and social 
heritage of the minority is safeguarded.  
Hah and Martin present a large number of different theories of nationalism that 
analyse the concept from very different points of view, spacing from the economic 
sector to the social. It is not possible to provide an exhaustive summary of all the 
different theories listed by the authors, but some are worth considering for the 
relevance of this paper. Still, the definition proposed by Deutsch (1953) is among the 
most discussed theories of nationalism, saying that it essentially consists of wide 
complementary social communication. It is defined as the ability to communicate 
more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large 
group than with outsiders. The sense of group integration is constituted by the 
communication among its members. In the case the communication among members 
is hindered relative to that among non-members, the likelihood that group integration 
will develop is also hindered. It follows that the extent to which this communication 
among groups is disturbed depends on the balance between the rate of social 
mobilisation, as well as the assimilation rate, which can be measured by the 
proportion in a given area of individuals who possess language and historical 
traditions different from those of the majority. Modernisation here plays a key role in 
the process, since according to the balance of assimilation and mobilisation factors it 
can either facilitate or slow down the level of communication that is essential for the 
process by which a group of individuals become a nationality and, subsequently, a 
nation-state. This theory has been criticised by other authors that consider 
modernisation just one, and not the most important, of many factors that affect the 
process. 
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About the role of modernization towards nationalism Eisenstadt (1966) and 
Smelser (1968) all share the idea that modernization leads only indirectly to group 
integration, unlike the theory previously discussed. These scholars perceive the 
process of development of nationalism as being influenced by the presence of 
modernization and its process of structural differentiation, in the so called erosion 
theory of nationalism. In this theory nationalism is regarded to be the existence of 
shared positive affection towards the nation-state or towards the formation of the 
latter. Hah and Martin exemplified the theory by explaining how modernization 
entails structural differentiations that detach people from their traditional roles. 
Hence there is a need for a socio-psychological for security and new identity that 
will push social groups to transfer their traditional allegiances to the emerging 
nation. Because of this nationalism will bloom in a society for the simple purpose of 
connecting traditional models of social organization that will vary for each group 
taken into account, to the new roles created by the modernisation process previously 
discussed. Discussing the impact of modernisation is an important factor, as the 
separatist movements that are discussed in this paper present different characteristics 
from their predecessors, as the continuous modernisation is playing a crucial role in 
shaping new dynamics and both national and international level.  
 
Language policies – 2.4 
The large number of scholarly pieces that engage with the topic of separatism 
and independence movements often refer to language policies that have an influence, 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative, on the topic. Any work on the subject 
that would consciously ignore this aspect of the issue would fail in framing crucial 
characteristics that should be considered. 
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Fishman (1986), providing a historical reference, states that by the middle of 
the 1970s, governmental utilisation of minority languages came to be increasingly 
questioned by mainstream and leading figures who felt that they constituted a threat 
to the state of the union, the very central, integrating institutions and traditions of 
modern, supra-ethnic society. Needless to say that a language in this context does not 
represent just a medium of communication adopted by a certain group of individuals, 
but it also constitutes an integrative, socio-cultural and economic-technical medium, 
symbol of aggregate that is not integrated with or is differentiated from the power 
centre. Language policies play a fundamental role in integrating minority language 
into the fabric of the society, so that any issue or clash that may arise is avoided or 
softened.  
Fishman connected the theme of bilinguism to separatism and spends time in 
providing an overview of the latter. According to him, separatism, especially when 
associated with political independence, would be the most extreme representation of 
the phenomenon. Lesser, and more common, degrees of separatism are forms of 
autonomy and self-government, such as various type of arrangements in which 
localities retain taxation privileges pertaining to local matters only to the extent that 
central authorities permit. This last point is often causing of internal clashes between 
central and regional governments.  
Fishman (1966) also writes about the influence of the level of linguistic 
homogeneity on a society and its economy. As previously discussed, it is not rare 
that minority languages, the cause of linguistic heterogeneity, are blamed as a threat 
to the stability of a society, especially if the nature of the government is dictatorial or 
non-democratic. Fishman’s studies demonstrate how linguistic heterogeneity can be 
tied to a superabundance of social, economic and political problems. He then 
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proceeds to explain how all but two of the many advantages of homogeneous polities 
over heterogeneous polities shrink and disappear when per capita gross national 
product is controlled. According to this he hypothesizes that it is not linguistic 
heterogeneity per se that is the cause of various disadvantages to which it is 
associated but, rather a lack of economic development. He continues discussing how 
economic development has tended to undermine linguistic heterogeneity far more 
than vice versa.  
Despite of the results of his research, these implications have been criticized by 
other scholars: Pool (1972) considers the evidence used as not sufficient to support 
Fishman claims. The two variables analysed deal with separate aspects: one with the 
presence of significant and politically non assimilated minorities in extreme 
opposition; the other deals with the same variable but on territorial bases. As one 
could easily infer, these variables do not reflect only linguistic aspects, but on the 
other hand they encompass religious and racial differences as well. Another scholar, 
McRae (1983), after further research on this relationship, claims that racial and 
linguistic heterogeneity is related to internal strife, while religious one is not. 
Fishman considers the extreme separatist solution, in its pursuit of a fully complete 
political independence, an extension of the territoriality principle to its extreme: the 
minority does not seek a major degree of autonomy but rather a fracture from the 
state they reside in, by gaining full sovereignty of a territory. While linguistic claims 
are very often connected to separatist movements, the success of a succession does 
not ensure a great improvement in the use of the minority language sponsored by the 
group.  
An example of this is represented by the Irish case where the inability of this 
solution to foster ethno linguistic autonomy caused the language to languish even 
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after the independence. It is also important to say that the Irish case stands as an 
example, and there are many other cases in which the results were different. At a 
more general level, it is possible to claim that in those cases in which the autonomist 
solution has deepest historical roots, ethno-linguistic strife is extremely minimal. On 
the contrary when considerable re-ethnification has already occurred, the benefits to 
be gained by autonomy pressures for minority languages are less certain. 
Keech (1972) claims that linguistic and religious differences are often 
presented as source of political conflict in democracies, as they have proved to be in 
Canada, Belgium and Northern Ireland. But his analysis of the Swiss situation shows 
that this presumption is not always true and that there are cases in which linguistic 
and religious differences can be overtaken. Despite of this, it is possible to generalise 
and point out how with the presence of variables, studied by Keech, the situation is 
likely to present political problems, even in the best cases. Although Switzerland has 
been proposed as a successful model, in four of his cantons, the one with the highest 
rate of mixed population, political and integration problems have arisen. The 
variables considered in the study of Keech could be summed up in three groups: 
conditions, perceptions and values that are directly related to linguistic differences; 
linguistic self-consciousness and prejudice between linguistic groups; and 
congruence of linguistic and other differences, with a direct perception of that 
congruence. 
Calhoun (1993), according to Anderson’s (1991) studies, schematised that 
language figures in at least three different ways in accounts of nationalism. The first 
assumption is that a central part of the claim that nationhood is rooted in ethnicity. 
Fichte’s use of the German language, for instance, to claim a supra-historical status 
of German nationality perfectly exemplifies this statement. Furthermore shared 
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language constitutes a condition, or at least a facilitator, of claimed national 
community despite of whether it is ancient or distinctive. It follows that opposition to 
linguistic variation is a key way in which nationalists and national movements in 
power attempt to make the nation fit the state. 
Paulston (1990) stresses how understanding the language maintenance and the 
social condition under which they occur represent an important means for 
understanding educational language policies. A language policy that is counter to 
existing socio-cultural forces is not likely to be very successful. Describing, 
explaining, predicting and, in the most lucky cases, correctly evaluating the success 
of language policies requires an in-depth study of socio-cultural forces and 
characteristics. The three outcomes that Paulston points out are: language 
maintenance, bilinguism, language shift. 
In the case of ethnic groups perceiving the learning of the national language 
well and fluently as in their best interest, there are very few problems associated with 
the educational policies for minorities. On the contrary when these same ethnic 
groups instead of fruitful opportunity see stigmatisation, discrimination, economic 
exploitation or systematic unemployment, they will be much more likely to use their 
mother tongue, instead of the national one, as a strategy for mobilisation. A great 
example of language maintenance is the Catalonian case, where language policies 
are implemented so that Catalan perfuses all aspects of daily life, spacing from social 
to economic context. 
The most common scenario is that minority groups in situations of prolonged 
contact within nation state will eventually shift to the language of the dominant 
group, whether over generations or a larger time interval. Bilinguism and exogamy, 
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which represent the marriage between people belonging to different ethnic and social 
groups, is often common and natural in situations of prolonged contact. 
Royce (1982) identified ethnicity as the sum total of feelings on the part of 
group members about those values, symbols and common history that identify them 
as a distinct group. Paulston links this concept to the language policies underlining 
how ethnicity alone is not sufficient to maintain a language in a multilingual setting 
if the dominant group allows assimilation and if incentive and opportunity of access 
to the national language are present. Paulston states that ethnicity is different from 
ethnic movements as it lacks a conscious strategy, typical of a political and social 
movement. Barth (1969) reinforced this idea by discussing how an ethnic movement 
is ethnicity turned militant, consisting of ethnic discontents who perceive the others 
on the model of us against them. Ethnicity stresses the culture, while ethnic 
movements are more concerned with boundary definition and maintenance. In 
addition to this, Paulston stressed how not even an ethnic movement alone will 
suffice in maintaining a language, although it will highly affect the rate of shift so 
that it becomes much slower and spans many more generations. A combination of a 
strong ethnic movement and effective language policies can succeed in integrating 
and maintaining the language by raising its status and importance within the 
community.  
As correctly pointed out by Paulston, language is not just a possible means of 
communication but it is a prime symbol of the nation in ethnic nationalism but not 
necessarily in geographic nationalism. Kohn’s definition, taken from the 
International Encyclopaedia of Social sciences describes that the first one can be 
considered in the case of the ethnic group to be isomorphic with the nation-state; the 
latter is more territorially based and features a political society, constituting a nation 
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of fellow citizens regardless of their ethnic background. Cottam (1963) insists on 
nationalism to be interpreted as the manifestation of nationalistic behaviour; a 
nationalist to be considered as an individual who sees himself as a member of a 
political community, or a nation, entitled to independent statehood, and who is 
willing to grant that community with a form of loyalty. For the purpose of this paper, 
the link between nationalism, hence some forms of separatism, and language is 
exemplified by Paulston’s observation on geographic nationalism. Given the fact it is 
not possible to change one’s ethnicity, it is very well possible to learn a foreign 
language, and in those nations where language is an active and crucial part of 
membership, mastering the language has clear practical, as well as symbolic, 
significance. National languages can be the hallmark of memberships and a clear 
proof of in-group belonging, despite one’s genes. 
 
The authors presented above discuss theoretically different characteristics and 
theme that play a role in separatist movements. Although identifying the 
phenomenon through a theoretical infrastructure is fundamental, some authors 
discussed the behaviour, to a certain extant, of separatist movements, as well as 
possible solutions and approaches to this situation. 
Anderson (1988) states that despite of the particularity of each singular study 
cases; there is clearly something to be learned by a higher level of generalization of 
the topic, which is difficult because of the substantial differences in the dynamics of 
group identity and interaction from case to case. Mikesell and Murphy (1991) 
indentify a clear starting point: an expressed opposition to the established political-
territorial order can be found in all separatist movements, with a different intensity of 
opposition varying from case to case. Perhaps the most benign form of minority 
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group aspiration occurs when a group wishes or welcomes formal recognition of its 
linguistic, or religious, identity without consequentially seeking proportional 
representation in a national government or in a national patronage system. There are 
also case in which a group may desire fuller participation in a larger national society 
and yet also looking forward maintaining some degree of separation, or some type of 
autonomy, within that society. This dualism of trying to be more involved, but at the 
same time defend one’s autonomy creates confusion and is often contradictory and 
not easy to handle by authorities. Higher level of frustration and misunderstanding 
between the group and the central government will lead to suspend claims for 
autonomy, and become calls for independence. 
Young (1986) provides a criticism to the modern state system, whose roots are 
located in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. There is an assumption that states should 
only be political-geographical expressions of a single people, an ideal embodied in 
the nation-state concept and pursued in some forms by all states. It is important to 
state how advocacy of independence for a minority group is usually rejected by the 
ruling majority as an act of insubordination. However, desire for recognition alone 
may also entail conflict if such recognition is denied. By denying legitimacy to a 
group, or in the harshest cases its existence, national governments can assert counter-
claims that the group is en route to assimilation, that its language is merely a dialect 
or that its faith is an unacceptable heresy. A good example of this anti-separatism 
attitude was used by Bulgaria against its Turkish minorities, as well as by Turkey 
against its Kurdish minorities. 
Jan and Brigitta Tullberg (1997) hypothesised a model for solving separatist 
demands. Although the model cannot be intended as a universal manual on how to 
deal with separatist claims, it deals with categories of issues that frequently arise in 
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that socio-political context. What is even more interesting is constituted by the fact 
that the authors think quite out of the social constraints, by analysing both the 
disadvantages, or the problems that prevent any form of separation, and the 
advantages, stating how in some cases separatism itself is one of the best possible 
solutions. 
They underline how internationalism and separatism, and their socio-political 
consequences, are two developments that are opposed in some respects: one does not 
entirely excludes the other. Tullberg also speak about what Dahbour previously 
defined as right to culture: people have the right to possess a culture independent of 
the national one, and this separate culture is often the raison d’être of a separate state. 
The authors focus on several problems that are the base of some of the 
weakness of separatist solutions. First of all a problem which often occur is that the 
process of separation recreates the old problem with reversed roles: the new state 
will inherit a significant minority from the old majority group. The alternatives 
provided operate on two different levels, both geographical and managerial. It is 
important to draw the new borders according to the population who resides in the 
geographical areas, trying to avoid as many divisions as possible: regardless of 
resources, infrastructures or other elements, population should be divided as equally 
as possible, and in the unlucky cases where this cannot be done, a roughly similar 
number of individuals should be wrongly places, from both sides. Furthermore 
geographical borders should be as neat and natural as possible, avoiding any separate 
enclave, or artificial barrier.  
As far as borders are concerned, there are three points highlighted by the 
authors that should be taken into consideration. First of all each state(s) should be 
responsible for accepting people of its own nationality, or according to the 
  29 
willingness and personal choice of the individual to stay on one side or another, 
without restrictions. In addition to this, each state should be entitled to evict 
members of the other group: in case an individual freely chooses to be part of the 
new state, then he shall be regarded as a foreigner in the old state, with all the legal 
consequences. The third condition is that each individual should have the right to 
emigrate to the right state, according to his/her personal choice. Despite the fact that 
these measures are somehow a bit extreme, especially the second point regarding the 
right to evict of a state, the authors reply that half measures are not this radical but 
they also fail in solving the problems that are regarded as insoluble in a shared state. 
One of the reasons why separatist movements often deviate into terrorist acts is that 
the democratic process is ardours:  ideas are opposed by a permanent majority, and 
in a tense atmosphere of us against them. 
The strongest alternative to separatism is represented by a liberal society that 
treats its citizens as individuals and not as member of groups. Instead of being the 
primary factor in developing identity, ethnic background would simply become one 
of the many characteristics that give distinctiveness to the individual. On the contrary 
of what have been discussed now, efforts have been made in many countries, in 
order to divide power and share the leadership, but the results did not produce any 
fruitful outcome in the long run. In Lebanon, the government opted for a sectarian 
division of power, so that each sect would not be cut off the others, but this division 
produced different outcomes than predicted: the actual situation is that divisions are 
burdening the country, instead of helping the development. Zambia opted for a tribal 
division of power, and once again the results were not as good as expected. 
The authors took advantage of a great metaphor to exemplify the issue stating 
that a separatist solution is similar to a divorce. Although it is preferable a separation 
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based on mutual respect and harmony, a divorce always involves a breakdown that 
will allow the two parties to divide their domain, rather than endure unity dominated 
by conflict. In addition to this, as in a divorce, it should be enough that one of the 
two parties opts for a separation, meaning that the public opinion can play a role in 
deciding on possible policies towards the separation, but it is crucial to remember 
that requests from the minority, which wants the breakdown, will hardly ever be 
supported by the majority of population. Dealing with minorities, by definition, will 
presume the considerations listed above.  
Hardin (1995) states that collective interests are stronger when they are 
consistent with individual interests and subsequently they are weaker when they are 
not. It becomes crucial to distinguish between real group interests and deceitful 
claims, often made from ethnic leaders to claim support, as well as some kind of 
altruism for a supreme culture or a historic mission. Most probably more education, 
understanding and respect and more personal experience of the opposite group would 
soften antagonism. Wong (1994) engages with ethnic separatism, indentifying 
plausible marks that constitute ground for the phenomenon. Wong lists five markers 
(language, religion, phenotype, homeland and the myth of common descent) that are 
likely to be present, not all of them at the same time and in each case, where ethnic 
separatism lies. It is important to remember that the origin of ethnic separatism is, 
despite the diversity of the many possible cases, rooted in conflicts which took 
places generations before. The author states how the contact hypothesis mentioned 
above has been often criticised since in order to really change the outcome, simple 
contact will not suffice. Constructive cooperation is the real element able to build a 
strong relationship between the two parties, while contact per se is not sufficient 
(Figer 1991). Other authors do not have such an optimistic view of the impact that a 
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higher level of education would have on ethnic conflicts. Although it is often said 
that more education should result in more tolerance from the different groups 
Horowitz (1991) does not agree with this and, on the contrary, he argues that there 
are some studies of divided societies which prove that elites are less ethnocentric 
than their supporters, but there are more showing that ethnocentrism increases with 
education. 
Despite the fact that many ethnic groups interpret themselves as distinct 
categories, it is crucial to keep in consideration the fact that society is full of 
subcultures, so it is necessary to place limits on what amounts to an ethnic group so 
that it cannot be correct for everyone claiming group membership to form separate 
state. Tullberg came to two characteristics that are required: a century, or more, of 
traditions within the country; and a minimum number of individuals. Needless to say 
those identities are extremely fluid entities that not only are not stable and set in 
stone, but which may develop in new concepts and entities with time, and according 
to the context in which the individual is living in. 
Giving a democratic option to separatists is a key advantage since when the 
democratic way is not present, separatists often become extreme and give rise to 
terrorist acts. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) when two parties in a 
dispute are facing a gain situation, people will likely choose the safest option 
possible; but on the other hand in a clear loss situation there is a risk shift: people are 
more likely to prefer the radical alternative that could eradicate the loss despite of all 
possible collateral damage. This theory applied to the relationship between the 
central state and the separatist movements often leads to violent clashes. Tullberg 
(1994) suggests how a strict anti-aggression policy between states should be military 
enforced, but this must not turn into an involvement in internal affairs. According to 
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the authors, democracy and freedom should be won by internal forces, and cannot be 
imported by problematic forms of imperialism. Propaganda does play a role but up to 
a certain point: if the real state of things is that within a society one or more groups 
are exploited, then the seed of separatism is sown and it becomes a matter of time for 
issues to arise. 
 
This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework for the purpose of this 
paper. As previously stated, it is not possible to provide a precise and universal 
definition of what constitutes a separatist movement. Still, as exemplified by 
Tullberg, two important characteristics are represented by the number of individuals 
and the quality of traditions that a group claims to have, rooted in an historical 
context and in an adequate amount of time. In addition to this, the themes that have 
been discussed (self-determination, nationalism and identity issues, linguistic 
policies) are likely to be present in most of separatist movements and will be used as 
possible markers for the purpose of the grouping of different movements in this 
paper. Conclusions will be drawn on the evidence found. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Secessionist and Pro-Independence Movements in the EU 
 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the current secessionist and pro-
independence movements throughout Europe. This chapter will present a chart with 
a summary of these groups found in Europe, divided by country and region. It will 
then discuss some general guidelines that were used in order to define which 
movements were included and which ones were left out. 
The concepts discussed in the second chapter were used in order to include or 
exclude a movement from the chart, in addition to the requirement for the 
movements to be actual and active at the present time. Given the extremely 
variegated political panorama, the concepts were useful in narrowing down the 
number of movements there were taken into consideration for the purpose of this 
research. It is important to remember that these characteristics do not apply to every 
single movement in the same way, and some of these variables play a bigger role in 
specific movements and not others. Because of these variations, a good degree of 
flexibility is required in order to understand how the movements in the list are 
different from each other for their goals, and the means with which these aims are 
pursued. Despite these differences, the movements listed can be placed on a 
continuum that runs from a mere need for more autonomy to total secession. 
The purpose of the list is also to present the reader with empirical data of the 
presence of regional and separatist movements in Europe. The chart is helpful in 
visualising where these movements are located geographically, and which countries 
have more movements than others. It also allows to have an idea of how these 
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movements are distributed through Europe, which regions are more influenced by 
regional identities, as well as which countries are more compact and possess no or 
few movements.  
In addition to this, the list functions as an overview of the many political 
entities that inhabit the European arena. All the single cases require more in-depth 
analysis in order to expose the structure of every single movement, as well as its 
historical claims and current goals. This will be done for three cases in the next 
chapter due to the time and space limits of this thesis. Presenting some case studies 
from a multitude of examples is useful to contextualise the phenomenon by looking 
at single specific cases. 
It is important to focus on how the political panorama of Europe is extremely 
variegated with a lot of different movements that are asking for more autonomy from 
their respective central governments. These movements encompass very different 
political positions, running from rather nationalist and right-wing positions, to more 
leftist and green stances, but are all combined by a desire for a greater degree of self-
government. It is often possible to have parties with very different political beliefs 
within the same territory or region that share a common will to greater and/or better 
self-government despite presenting differences in how these goals should be 
achieved and which goals should be the top priorities. 
Another important thing that should be noted is the fact that the list presented 
in this chapter should not be intended as a definitive encyclopaedia but rather as an 
overview whose purpose is to introduce the reader to the maze of entities that are 
seeking independence, or just more autonomy.  
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Many difficulties were encountered while compiling the list. When 
researching autonomist and secessionist movements, it is hard to understand their 
importance without being a resident in the areas they are located in. This is why 
some of the political movements listed are rather small and do not really have strong 
impacts on their respective national contexts, while others are the major political 
parties within the regional, and sometimes national, elections and do play an 
important role that cannot be ignored by the central governments.  
Another important factor that should be taken into consideration is that the 
movements listed are not all seeking secession. For a better understanding of the list, 
all the movements should be understood as being located  on a continuum indicating 
different degrees of autonomy, where independence and secession should represent 
one extreme. Some of these territories and regions possess already high levels of 
autonomy from their central governments, and this is why their logical progression 
towards more self-government is independence. However, not all the movements 
listed are actively contemplating the option of such significant change in the status 
quo: for the same territory it is usually possible to find more than one parties which 
claim for a certain degree of independence. 
In other cases more independence is required in some, but not all, aspects of 
the regional government. Sometimes these claims are more economic-oriented, 
aiming for more local management of taxes and other incomes; while other times 
these claims are rooted on cultural and linguistic claims, especially when it comes to 
the consideration of possible annexations to neighbouring countries. In the case of 
stateless communities, such as the Sami people of the far north of Europe, this 
discourse does not apply at all, as it is not even possible to discuss to which degree 
autonomy or self-government is intended, as no governable entity exists. The level of 
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self-government can be measured on the extent to which the stateless entities interact 
positively with the hosting country. In the Sami case, the hosting governments of 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Russian Federation have all allowed some degrees 
of self-government to the Sami people, but this autonomy varies according to the 
hosting country. While in Norway the Sami have the right to their own parliament,3 
Russia has yet to  adopt the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (C169)4 
and in doing so, depriving the Sami of many rights. 
Chart of Political Movements and Parties - 3.1 
 
Table 1.1 - Separatist Political Parties and Movements in the EU 
Country 
Geographical Region in which 
the Regional or Separatist 
Movement is located Name of Regional or Separatist Movement 
Belgium Flemish Region Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
  
  Vlaams Belang 
  
  Libertair, Direct, Democratisch; LDD 
 
Walloon Region Rassemblement wallon 
  
  Rassemblement Wallonie France 
 
German Speaking Community 
of Belgium   
Czech Republic Moravia Moravané 
Denmark Faroe Islands Framsókn 
  
  Hin føroyski fólkaflokkurin – radikalt sjálvstýri 
  
  Miðflokkurin 
  
  Sjálvstýrisflokkurin 
  
  Tjóðveldi 
  
Greenland Inuit Ataqatigiit 
  
  Siumut 
Finland Åland Islands Ålands Framtid 
                                                           
3Sami Parliament in Norway, last retrieved Mar 20th from  http://www.samediggi.no  
4 Mihailova, E.R. "Reprisals against the Kola Sami". Cultural almanac ASTES number 5.  
  37 
France Northen Basque Country Parti National Basque 
  
Brittany Adsav 
  
  Parti Breton 
  
  Union Démocratique Bretonne 
  
  Emgann 
  
Corsica Corsica Libera 
  
  U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa 
  
Alsace Unser Land 
  
Normandy   
  
Occitania Occitan Party 
Germany Bavaria Bayernpartei 
Italy  (Claims over Padania area) La Lega Nord 
  
Aosta Valley Union Valdôtaine 
  
  Edelweiss Aosta Valley 
  
  Fédération Autonomiste, FA 
  
  Autonomie, Liberté, Participation, Écologie, ALPE 
  
Trentino Unione per il Trentino, UpT 
  
  Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese 
  
  Unione Autonomista Ladina, UAL 
  
South Tirol Partito Popolare Sudtirolese 
  
  Union für Südtirol 
  
  Die Freiheitlichen 
  
  Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, STF 
  
Veneto Partito Nasionał Veneto, PNV 
  
  Unitá Popołare Veneta, UPV 
  
  Łiga Vèneta Republica, LVR 
  
Friuli Venezia Giulia Movimento Friuli, MF 
  
Free Territory of Trieste Fronte Giuliano 
 
 Trieste Libera 
  
Liguria  Movimento Indipendentista Ligure (M.I.L.) 
  
Sardinia Sardignia Natzione 
  
  Partito Sardo d'Azione, PSdAz 
  
  Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna, IRS 
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  ProgRes 
  
Sicily Movimento per l'Indipendenza della Sicilia, MIS 
Lithuania Samogitia Žemaičių partija 
Netherlands Frisia Friese Nationale Partij 
Poland Upper Silesia Ruch Autonomii Śląska 
Portugal Madeira 
  
Azores Partido Democrático do Atlântico 
Romania Székely Land Szekler National Council 
Spain Basque Countries Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
  
  Solidaridad Vasca 
  
  Bildu 
  
  Aralar 
  
Catalonia Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya 
  
  Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
  
 Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds 
  
 Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, CUP 
  
  Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència, SI 
  
  Reagrupament Independentista 
  
Val D'Aran Convergencia Aranesa 
  
  Unitat D'Aran 
  
Balearic Islands Partit Socialista de Mallorca, PSM 
  
Valencian Community Esquerra Republicana del País Valencià 
  
  Bloc Nacionalista Valencià 
  
  Coalició Compromís 
  
Aragon Chunta Aragonesista 
  
  Estau Aragonés 
  
  Tierra Aragonesa 
  
Galicia Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
  
  Nós-Unidade Popular 
  
  Frente Popular Galega 
  
  Terra Galega 
  
  Alternativa Galega de Esquerda, AGE 
  
Andalusia Partido Socialista Andaluz 
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  Bloque Andaluz de Izquierdas 
  
  Partido Comunista del Pueblo Andaluz 
  
Asturias Partíu Asturianista (PAS) 
  
  Andecha Astur (AA) 
  
Cantabria Conceju Nacionaliegu Cántabru, CNC 
  
Canary Islands Coalición Canaria 
  
  Congreso Nacional de Canarias; CNC 
  
Castile and Leon Tierra Comunera 
  
  Izquierda Castellana, IzCa 
  
Ceuta and Melilla (Autonomous 
Cities)   
Sweden Scania Skånepartiet 
United Kingdom Cornwall Mebyon Kernow- The Party for Cornwall 
  
  Cornish Green Party 
  
England UK Independence Party 
  
  English Democrats 
  
Isle of Wight   
  
Wessex Wessex Regionalist Party 
  
Northern Ireland   
  
Scotland Scottish National Party 
  
  Scottish Green Party 
  
  Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) 
  
  Scottish Democratic Alliance (SDA) 
  
  Solidarity 
  
Wales Plaid Cymru 
  
  Wales Green Party 
  
  Llais Gywnedd 
  
  Cymru Annibynnol 
  
Channel Islands   
  
Isle of Man Mec Vannin 
  
  Liberal Vannin Party (LVP) 
  
Gibraltar Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Russia Sami People (Stateless Nation) 
Sápmi (cultural and geographical region traditionally 
inhabited by the Sami people and proposed as 
autonomous region) 
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In the chart the different movements are grouped according to the country(ies) 
they are located in. A second subdivision is used to group under the same regional 
area all the different political entities that concur to similar goals. 
One of the biggest challenges was to list, as accurately as possible, those 
political entities that are still active and part of the present political arena. In order to 
do this, I repeatedly checked all the internet sites of the various movements and I did 
not include the ones whose websites were not available anymore, closed or 
malfunctioning. This tool is intended to be one of the simplest means to assure that a 
political group did not cease to exist nor that they united with other parties. Despite 
this, political entities are not set in stone, but are rather variable and somehow hard 
to pin down, especially when formed by a small number of supporters as it is often 
the case that they try to reinvent their selves by mutating and merging with other 
entities. 
The list does not include many parties that were banned as being militias 
because of the detention of weapons and being part of episodes of violence and 
aggression. The are reasons why such type of parties are excluded from the list. It is 
important to notice at first that a lot of militia movements that are commonly well 
known in the public opinion are not active anymore, and the chart does not include 
parties that ceased to exist. In addition to this, militia movements are almost always 
labelled as illegal by the central governments and hence the citizens cannot freely 
vote for them, because they stop being considered as part of the political panorama. 
Therefore their methods shift from being political to being more oriented to 
propaganda and violent coercion, hence they cannot be compared, nor analysed, as 
standard political parties.  
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It should be clear that this paper does not seek to judge the actions of these 
parties, or to take position in the matter. At the same time, it is impossible to deny 
the impact that such parties sometimes have on secessionist matters. Many examples 
could be presented about this matter, also within the modern states members of the 
European Union, if we just take a look at Irish or Basque history for instance. These 
two cases are perfect examples of the degeneration of the relationship between 
central government and its regions: a failure in understanding and taking in 
consideration the need for a decentralisation of power. In the theoretical chapter the 
issue regarding the development of regional militias and violent political party 
engaged with the set of problems derived from the sterile communication, which 
often results in severe repression, of regional movements.  
An interesting observation regarding this issue is how governments tend to 
label anything coming from a repressed regional opposition as terrorism, despite the 
fact the term is now widely use for anything that opposes with violence the status 
quo. Labelling organizations that seek to alter the status quo as ‘terrorist’ is often an 
excellent method to suppress them as it often happened through history. Rather than 
labelling groups, however, perhaps the label should be used on acts. If, for instance, 
a number of individuals claiming to be part of a specific political movement commit 
a bomb attack on a school bus, then that act is a terrorist act. But extending this idea 
to the whole movement, and to the entire ideology is somehow inexact and leads to 
misinterpretations.  
Pyle (1986) engages in the controversial issue of defining terrorism by 
describing the continuous use of double standards by the international community. 
He summarises how what one government defines as a terrorist can be easily 
considered as a criminal who should be relentlessly hunted down and punished at all 
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costs by one state; and being labelled as a freedom fighter who deserves full support 
by another state. Pyle quotes a British judge called Lord Diplock in defining 
terrorism as the use or threat of violence to achieve political ends. Furthermore he 
expresses how almost every country on earth auto defines itself as a democracy, and 
that even the most democratic countries have conquered and ruled other lands by 
non-democratic (i.e. violent) means. Countless examples could be quoted on the 
matter, and the author provides a lot of historical periods in which many group of 
individuals were considered terrorist without taking in consideration the political, 
social and economic contexts they were inserted in. Hence although one act of brutal 
and indiscriminate violence can be considered as terrorist, extending this definition 
to its actors is unlikely to produce neutral and impartial precedents.  
Regardless of how much these acts can be (rightly) criticised, militia 
movements have gained a lot of power (at times) and managed to win some 
concessions from their respective central governments, and in the case of IRA I 
would argue that the constant strong opposition played a crucial role in helping 
Ireland to separate from the United Kingdom. White (1989) conducted research on 
the primal causes for the use of violence related to political use, focussing on the 
case of the IRA. He describes how state repression, and not economic deprivation, 
was the major determinant in trigging the use of brutal force in the controversy. 
According to his research there are some characteristics that ignite the use of 
violence. First of all victims of repression must consider the authority as illegitimate; 
they must consider peaceful means of protest as ineffective and futile; and the 
situation escalate quickly once people start to react to repression of people with 
whom they share close ties with. This emphasises how the relationship between the 
periphery, in this case Ireland, and the central government, represented by the United 
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Kingdom, was crucial in the issue. Hence the way separatist claims are considered, 
or ignored by the authorities, plays a role in the formation of militia movements. 
Perhaps history suggests that ignoring regional claims often leads to dangerous 
paths, for both the population and the government of a country. 
As previously explained, the list does not include those secessionist and pro-
autonomy movements that are located in countries that are not part of the European 
Union, even when geographically located in Europe. The only exception in the list is 
the non-territorial entity represented by the Sami people who are located also within 
Norway and the Russian Federation. In addition to this, I did not include the Cypriot 
issue and its current division with the occupied territories, also known as the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti), as it is a very 
debated and complicated issue that cannot be easily included with the independent 
movements, nor identified as such, and, most importantly, includes a non-EU 
member state: Turkey. 
Other groups included in the chart are not trying to gain separation from the 
central state, but have and still seek a relatively high level of autonomy. Specifically, 
this is the case for Ceuta5 and Melilla6, Spanish enclaves located in Morocco, but 
that are legally part of the Spanish State. Their geographical location and their 
history have granted them a high level of autonomy and it is interesting to see how 
their status is bound to these characteristics. 
Despite the fact it would be beneficial, for this thesis, to deepen the discussion 
related to every single case on the list; it would require a great amount of time. This 
is why I have chosen to engage in further discussion only three study cases in the 
                                                           
5 Municipality of the Autonomous City of Ceita, last retrived 20th March from 
http://www.ceuta.es/ceuta/  
6 Official Site of the Autonomous City of Melilla, last retrived 20th March from 
http://www.melilla.es/melillaportal/home.jsp  
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next chapter, in order to outline the correspondence between the markers indicated in 
the previous chapters and real movements. Furthermore the brief overview of some 
of the actual separatist movements will provide the reader with fresh and updated 
material grounded on the present state of things. These cases are Scotland, Catalonia, 
and Trieste. 
 
Scotland’s and Catalonia’s movements are two of the best organized and active 
autonomous areas at the present time, and both of their current local governments 
suggest that the need of further autonomy should be found in secession from 
respectively the United Kingdom and Spain respectively. Although the two cases 
present a lot of common characteristics it is interesting to understand their different 
histories and relations with their present central governments. 
Trieste, a city located in Italy, whose official status as county seat of the region 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia is being contested and rejected by a movement that claims 
Trieste is a free territory, according to resolution 16 of the United Nations and rejects 
subsequent international treaties that do not respect the resolution. The case is 
controversial and different from those of Scotland and Catalonia, as the controversy 
lies between the interpretation, and failure to respect, UN resolutions that attested the 
area as an independent territory. To further complicate the case, while Trieste is a de-
facto Italian city at the present time, some of its territories were split between Italy 
and the former Yugoslavia.  
In conclusion, the movements and political parties that will be part of the 
analysis, and that are listed in the chart presented above, are modern and active 
parties with pro-autonomy and secessionist aims which are located in countries 
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which are part of the European Union. The next chapter will engage with three study 
cases, in order to compare the theory presented with real empirical cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  46 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Case Studies 
 
This chapter will deal with some of the cases listed in chapter three, and will 
seek to provide a more in-depth analysis of some of the current issues related to 
separatist movements in EU member states. Out of the multitude of cases—for the 
reasons discussed in the previous chapter--three were chosen to be discussed here: 
the cases of Catalonia, Scotland, and of the Territories of Trieste. 
Catalonia and Scotland can be considered as two typical cases of separatism, 
both presenting a high degree of organization, self-government and autonomy. 
Trieste’s case is quite different as its autonomy, or currently lack of it, is bound to 
international law as well as a resolution of the United Nations.  
 
Catalonia – 4.1 
The Catalan case is one of the most recent and widely known through the media and 
word of mouth. This section includes a brief excursus through the history of 
Catalonia that will highlight some of the historical grounds on which Catalan 
separatism is based. It will then engage with the issue of language, in order to point 
out the efforts of the Catalan regional government to promote and defend Catalan 
language. Furthermore this section will discuss some articles taken from the media 
so that it is possible to take in consideration the reactions of the public opinion and 
of other politicians. Finally, the degree to which various groups in Catalonia seek 
autonomy will be compared. 
Catalonia was chosen among the movements because of its high profile in the  
international media and within the European arena. The Catalonian quest for 
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independence stands as one of the most quintessential separatist movements, with 
solid historical claims, language policies as well as crucial economic aspects. The 
characteristics presented in the theoretical chapter will be discussed more in-depth in 
the Catalan case, showing how theory meets empirical application on the case.  
 
Hints of Catalonian History – 4.1.1 
To start, it is worth remarking that Catalonia already enjoys a very high degree of 
self-government which was achieved through time and specific political choices by 
both the regional and national government (Gies, 1994). Despite one’s personal 
views and feelings about the Catalan issue, it is often said that money and language 
are the two keys to Catalan politics. Being the strongest economy in the Iberian 
Peninsula surely plays a role in national as well as regional and local politics. In 
addition to this Spain’s loose federal arrangements between the different provinces, 
established in the post-Franco constitution of 1978, allows Catalonia significant 
freedom in making laws and spending funds for a large variety of areas of interest, 
spacing from culture and infrastructure, to government services (Gies, 1994). Still, it 
should be noted that taxes are still administered at a central level rather than 
peripheral. 
The historical grounds of Catalan secessionism cannot be ignored by 
focussing only on the economic and cultural aspects of the issue, however. McNair 
(1980) exemplifies how it is possible to talk about a Catalan people already in 
Roman times, stretching this period (with of course a large number of different 
historical events in between) until the incorporation into the Crown of Castile in 
1715. Needless to say the process of inclusion was neither peaceful nor particularly 
voluntary on the part of the Catalans.  
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Gies (1994) also points out how this loss of autonomy was followed by a 
repression of Catalan culture of varying degrees of intensity for about two centuries, 
with the direct effect of inflaming the Catalan national sentiment. Under the second 
republic (1931-1939) this sentiment was actualized under the Generalitat, probably 
the most central institution of Catalonia, leading to a greater self-administration. This 
period of greater autonomy was harshly contested and repressed during Franco’s 
government, whose regime imposed linguistic, political and cultural restrictions 
across Spain by labelling as illegal any kind of public activity associated with 
Catalan nationalism, including the publication of books on those subjects or simply 
discussion of them in open meetings. At Franco’s demise the Generalitat reacquired 
its powers, and Catalonia gained in 1979 a large degree of regional autonomy (Julier, 
1996).  
Gies (1994) also points out that in addition to historical claims, Catalans are 
well aware of their vast literary history in Catalan, and of a conspicuous number of 
writers and artists who have contributed in creating a great humanistic panorama. 
The author presents many examples to sustain his thesis. It is interesting to notice 
how the first book published on the Iberian Peninsula, Tirant lo Blanc by Joanot 
Martorell, was published in Catalan in Valencia in 1490. Ramon Llull (1235 – 1316) 
used Catalan in his encyclopaedic works of science, philosophy and religion, as well 
as in his novel called Blanquerra. Bernat Metge (1343-1413), Anselm Turmeda 
(1352 - 1430), Jordi de Sant Jordi (1400-24), and Ausiàh March (1397 – 1459) are 
other famous intellectuals who made use of Catalan language in their works. Cultural 
aspects are important markers of self-awareness of a region, as well as other 
characteristics presented by the next authors. 
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Robbins (1933) explains how regional diversity is a first key to Spanish 
politics and cannot be underestimated. The mosaic of languages is but one piece of 
evidence of the multi-cultural soul of the country, and Robbins discusses the 
importance of language politics. In spite of the different time period even at the 
present time the Catalan question is of course most often raised in terms of fiscal 
problems, but at the same time it is not possible to brush aside the linguistic aspects 
of the issue and how these are connected to the secession movement.  
 
The Catalan Language – 4.1.2 
In 1978, Catalan became a compulsory subject in all pre-schools, as well as 
in elementary and secondary education (McNair, 1980). In addition to this, those 
schools which have enough funding and parental support have long been  highly 
encouraged to teach a variety of different subjects in Catalan, rather than in Spanish 
(McNair, 1980). According to the Law of Linguistic Normalization (1983), Catalan is 
officially the dominant language of instruction in the region. Gies (1994) stresses 
how the Genetalitat has promulgated numerous laws that have allowed Catalan 
language to infuse the everyday life of Catalans from many different aspects. Under 
Pujol’s office, president of the Generalitat de Catalunya from 1980 to 2003, Catalan 
language and history started being taught in the schools as a compulsory subject, and 
the use of the language highly increased in print, on TV as well as in official 
government business issues. 
After the promulgation of regional authority in 1983, the Catalan language 
acquired a more central position in defining and shaping the new Catalan region. 
From a legal point of view, the language debate reached to a turning point when the 
Supreme Court recognized two official languages in Catalonia and ruled positively 
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on pivotal articles of the Linguistic Normalization Law. For instance, primary 
students possess the legal right, and duty, to be educated in both languages (except 
some specific cases in which exemptions are considered). The certificate of 
complexion is issued to those students who prove proficient in both languages, and 
not just one of the two. In addition to this, Catalan must be the linguistic vehicle for 
instruction and administration purposes in educational institutions, but without 
implying that it will be the only language that will be utilized (Rees, 1996). 
Yet, is the Catalan language so crucial to fully understand what is going on in 
Catalonia as far as politics are concerned? Apparently it is, in order to get a full and 
aware global picture of the issue. Gade (2003) states how Catalonia exemplifies 
emerging national identities of which language is considered the symbolic glue. 
Furthermore language energises a group towards self-determination, as it represents 
part of the collective cultural capital of the people who speak it by heightening the 
consciousness of difference towards those who cannot speak it. As discussed earlier 
in this thesis, the role of language in nationalism, as well as self-determination, is 
more emotional rather than rational because of the fact that language is closely tied 
to the individual self. Because of this, equating language with nation is a matter-of-
factly accepted in the present world. It is important to remember that this should not 
lead to wrong conclusions: language is not an innate characteristic of human 
societies but it is rather a romantic and ideological construct. 
 
Catalan Institutions: Recent Debates and Media Coverage– 4.1.3 
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The very last debate regarding Catalonia revolves around an interesting 
political choice made by the Catalan parliament: a declaration of sovereignty7 stating 
the right to self-determination of the Catalan people. The official language of the 
declaration was, as one may expect, Catalan. Despite of this it is interesting to see 
how the declaration became available in a large variety of languages8, both European 
and non-European. Furthermore there have been many translations into minority 
languages—a sign of mutual respect between an institution whose official language 
is itself a minority language within Spain, and other minority languages, as well as 
their respective people and political movements. The parliament voted 85-41 for the 
declaration, with two abstentions on January 24, 2013. The declaration does not talk 
about a separation from Spain but it surely prepares the ground for such manoeuvres. 
The structure of the declaration is divided into two main sectors: an historical one, 
dealing with the Catalan people through their history, and a more actual one, which 
sums up in point the principles on which the declaration, as well as the political 
philosophy behind Catalonia, is based. The conclusion is perhaps one of the most 
interesting parts as it literally9 pushes Catalans towards the active participation, to 
political life and in playing a role within Catalans politics. Perhaps a not too veiled 
way to suggest there is more to come and that Catalans’ support is required to 
succeed.  
It should be noted here that this injection of self-determination seems to many 
specialists another step towards more independence, with a possible secession from 
                                                           
7 Declaració de sobirania i el dret de decidir del poble de Catalunya. Last retrieved 27th Mar 2013 from 
http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/4076809/20130123/declaracio-sobirania-dret-decidir-poble-
catalunya.html  
8 Traduccions de la declaració de sobirania del Parlament de Catalunya. Last Retrieved 27th Mar 2013 
from http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/4076896/20130124/declaration-of-sovereignty-and-of-the-
right-to-decide-of-the-catalan-nation.html   
9 “[…] The Parliament of Catalonia encourages all citizens to take an active role in the democratic 
process for the right to decide of the Catalan people. […]” 
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Spain, and it is one of many episodes of an ongoing series of events pushing 
Catalonia to the separatist direction. On September 2013, about 1.5 million people, 
which constitute about 20% of Catalonia's entire population, filled the streets of 
Barcelona in a massive protest demanding independence. The Spanish government 
insists the Spanish constitution does not allow any of Spain's regions to unilaterally 
break away; hence it does not negotiate with the Catalan government adopting a 
strict and no-compromise policy10. Pujol, spokesman for CiU commented how the 
declaration does not stand as a legal regulation or as a road map. He also adds that 
“[…] Right now we are declaring what the foundations will be made of. The stronger 
the foundations, the stronger the walls […]”.11 ERC leader Junqueras defined this 
episode as what he called a historical day. He remarked how sovereignty implies, 
literally, that there is nothing that ranks higher than the democratic will of the 
people. In response to the Socialists’ proposal for shared sovereignty with Spain, 
Junqueras gave a negative reply specifying that the right to decide cannot be shared 
with another legal entity by being a matter of one, not two or three entities12. Angels 
Folch, a national co-ordinator of the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC), is 
confident that the outcome will be independence eventually, and that those who 
dissolved the last parliament are focussed in giving Catalonian citizens the right to 
vote and determine their own future. Folch adds that it is likely to be a referendum 
maybe two or three years later, allowing the people to take personal position on the 
matter. She argues how the time frame for all this is quite confined and how it cannot 
take too long before more steps on that direct are undertaken. Her attitude towards 
                                                           
10 Goodman, Al. “Catalan parliament declaration pushes self-determination”, CNN. Last retrieved Mar 
28th 2013 from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/23/world/europe/spain-catalan-self-determination   
11 Roger, Maiol and Rìos, Pere. “Catalan parliament approves sovereignty declaration”, El Paìs. Last 
retrieved Mar 28th  from http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/01/23/inenglish/1358972575_401789.html  
12 Ibid. 
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the central government is very harsh and negative and most likely shared by many 
Catalans secessionists. She criticises how the idea that Spain is a true federal 
democracy, in which all the nationalities' rights are respected, is a joke. In addition to 
this she reinforces her thesis by stating how Spain is a democratic facade hiding a 
fundamentally imperialist structure, formed by a series of nations that Castile 
conquered and called “Spain”13. 
The opinions of Catalan commentaters14 are not too different from the ones 
already presented. According to Przemyk15 an independent Catalonia would have the 
opportunity to provide a restructuring and modernisation of all legislative and 
judicial departments which at the moment depend on the central government and are 
extremely slow and ineffective in satisfying citizens’ needs towards the bureaucratic 
apparatus. In addition to this the economic issue becomes central by taking into 
account that about 20 billion €, paid to Madrid every year and not returned, could be 
used elsewhere to improve social welfare, education and infrastructures. Bedson16 
agrees, noting that Catalonia would no longer be a support fund for the rest of the 
country, as resources could be used to improve the infrastructures and much cultural 
and economic energy would be released in the euphoria of independence. He then 
comments how the secession would resolve problems with the dysfunctional 
monarchy, army and the Spanish Church and the insidious influence of the right 
wing Madrid media. Núñez’s17 opinion is rather sceptical about the issue but still 
positive about independence, although for different reasons. He points out that 
                                                           
13 “Catalonia independence timetable: 'Once it has started it cannot stop”.  The Guardian. Last 
retrieved 28th Nov 2013 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2012/nov/24/catalonia-
independence-timetable  
14 “Would Catalonia be better as an independent nation?”. The Guardian. Last Retrieved 28th Nov 2013 
from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/20/readers-panel-independent-catalonia-spain  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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independence would be a way to stop blaming each others’ faults and to 
constructively rebuild a When there is no enemy to blame and no excuses left, 
perhaps they will start looking within themselves in search for the cause of their 
problems. He considers the current issue less related to numbers and money than it is 
commonly understood, but rather what he defines it old tribalism, between Catalonia 
and the central government. This is an interesting opinion that starts from a different 
point of view but still culminates, for a different variety of reasons, in independence.  
Catalonia clearly proves to be an interesting case and it presents all 
characteristics discussed in the previous chapters. Let us move now to Scotland, 
another case by the book. 
 
Scotland – 4.2 
The Scottish case has been gaining visibility in the media as well as in 
numerous debates in the political arena. As some scholars have actually underlined, 
the Scottish case possesses many points of comparison with the Welsh case, within 
the UK, and with the Catalan case which was just briefly presented. This section will 
discuss the historical roots of Scottish nationalism, as well as how the modern 
Scottish National Party is dealing with self-identity issues. The discussion will then 
move to language issues, regarding the use of Scottish Gaelic, and to economic 
issues, before concluding with analysis of the reaction of public opinion, as well as 
of the central government, to Scotland’s push for independence. 
The Scottish case was chosen as it represents a case that is gaining more and 
more importance throughout the United Kingdom. Furthermore it presents a lot of 
parallelisms with the Catalan case, despite the structural differences between Spain 
and the UK. The Scottish separatist movements possess the characteristics 
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introduced in chapter two, and this chapter will further analyse its historical grounds, 
the language policies as well as the economic aspects. In addition to this, the 
growing presence of Scottish separatism on the media will be briefly discussed. 
 
Hints of Scottish History – 4.2.1 
Keating (1998) points out that there has been a significant change in the 
political relationship between Scotland and England, which stands here as the central 
government, especially during the mandate of prime minister William Ewart who 
was more prone to a conversion of the UK from a centralised state to a federation of 
self-governing nations and regions. When dealing with Scotland it is crucial to keep 
in mind that Scotland has not always been part of the United Kingdom. From the 
prehistory to the Middle Ages, Scotland constituted an entity quite separated from 
England, and the Kingdom of Scotland was unified with England only in 1706, with 
the Treaty of Union that constituted the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, until 
1998 when Scotland regained more self-government and the Scottish Parliament was 
re-instituted. The political tradition of Great Britain lies on a more decentralised 
model than the traditional Jacobin structure of the state, which tends to concentrate 
state powers rather than delegate them. This political structure, associated with the 
rise of nationalism across Europe in the late 19th century stands as a challenge to 
multinational states and empires. The regional level is emerging as a key factor in 
politics and political strategies hence it cannot be ignored nor taken for granted when 
dealing with sovereign states. 
Keating emphasises how minority nationalism in Scotland, as well as in Wales, 
was often marked as tribal and atavistic, especially because of the pejorative label of 
“ethnic” that distinguished from the so defined “civil” nation-building of the large 
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states that encompassed a variety of ethnicities. At the present time minority 
nationalist should be interpreted more as a search for civic community, new 
principles of solidarity and internal cohesion against the international market. The 
author stresses how this cultural dimension, ignored in many of the studies of 
minority nationalism developed in the UK, shall serve to rebuild its public domain 
while reinforcing territorial identities. 
Keating also concludes that a greater degree of independence, incarnated by 
the Scottish parliament, which was suppressed by the union of the King of Scotland 
and the King of England in 1707 and re-established in 1997, will not inevitably lead 
to independence but Scotland will seek to gain stronger relations in order to maintain 
a place in the European Union. Keating doubts that the Scottish parliament, inserted 
in a European context, will be content with the role of a subordinate government in 
the long run. 
Rawkins (1978) describes national movements as collective attempts to make 
sense, politically as well as psychologically, of the life experience on the periphery 
of the economically advanced core of the modern world system. It is clear from the 
Scottish case how economics are perceived as one, if not the most, important factor 
when dealing with secessionism. Rawkins introduces Michael Hecter’s theory, 
summarising that nationalist movements are engaged in conflict with what he defines 
as insensitive, distant and over centralised bureaucracy (according the Jacobin 
model) which tries to maintain the status of the ethnically distinct, peripheral regions 
as vassals to the state in order to maintain the advantage of the dominant ethnic 
group which controls it. It is important to acknowledge that this theory is not very 
recent and that, if taken literally, it better fits cases different from the ones that are 
being presented in this chapter.  
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Despite this, with the correct adaptations to each single case, a lot can be 
connected to this theory. The author states how in breaking out from the Britishness, 
Scottish (as well as Welsh) movements seek to forge a new, broad based political 
alliance among the social groups within the territorial boundaries of Scotland, by 
focussing on distinctive cultural symbols, common sensitivity to the various forms of 
deprivation as well as shared goals. Scottish nationalist movements try to create and 
develop autonomous political and social institutions responsive to the needs of those 
who reside in the periphery, whose interests are, for a variety of reasons, structurally 
different from those who reside closer to the centre. Some argued how a 
supranational set of institutions, such as the European Union, might provide an 
appropriate framework to tackle and efficiently resolve complex problems of 
regional inequality. The present circumstances, associated with a growing will of 
more self-government are signs that perhaps these hypothesis were either wrong, or 
rather that the appropriate framework mentioned above was not enacted correctly.  
In addition to this it is important to remember that Scottish identity has been 
reinforced through the years by the existence of a range of distinctive institutions. 
The Presbyterian Church, a different legal system as well as the education system 
have always played a role in differentiating Scotland from England first, and the rest 
of Great Britain at a second stage. These specific characteristics of Scotland 
reinforce the historical, cultural and economic bases of the national movement by 
providing key elements that shaped Scotland through its history to our present times.  
From a more economic oriented point of view, it is interesting that even within 
the world economic system; the declining power of the British state is significant to 
the political analysis of the status quo. Scotland, unlike Catalonia, is not en economic 
pioneer of the UK, yet the national movement does not perceive this as a problem, 
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but it rather reinforces the thesis that more self-government would allow Scotland to 
take important decisions that will positively affect its economy. 
Fusaro (1979) engaged in a comparison between the Scottish National Party 
and the Welsh National Party (Plaid Cymru). He underlines how nationalist 
movements argue that Britain is not a homogenous nation and that the two parties 
could be considered as “movements” rather than conventional political parties, since 
they rely on the nationalist substratum of the their potential electorate by promoting 
and defending those values that represent, or wish to represent, the territory they 
reside in. They do not just propose political agendas to be followed but they seek to 
create a heightened sense of nationalism which can be tapped politically. A lot of 
initiatives taken from the Scottish National Party deal with self-government and 
defence and promotion of Scottish culture, but this political attitude do not 
necessarily a general striving for independent statehood, as the author suggests. They 
surely indicate the pride of many Scots in their own history and culture, to which one 
may infer that this pride is an important characteristic in Scottish and British politics.  
Cohen (1996) states that in the Scottish case, self-identity would be 
misunderstood if regarded as being determined by, or derived from membership of 
the nation or as a determined result of any collective condition. Hence Scottish 
Nationalism can very well be considered as a statement of identity, whose nature is 
somehow separated from more “partisan” and leftist political programmes. From a 
more general perspective it is possible to affirm that as an idea found widely across 
the political and social panorama, nationalism has appeared more as a lament for the 
continuing privation of the integrity and authenticity of Scottish nationhood, after the 
abolition of the Scottish state in 1707 due to its unification with England. This is 
why the use of the nationalist elements in Scottish politics comes more natural and 
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works in a more effective way than cases in which the nationalist elements are built 
for the sole purpose of political propaganda. 
Grant and Docherty (1992) states that the Scottish National Party had about 
20% of the public support in Scotland, and that about 80% of the Scottish population 
are in favour of some form of self-government, which is the policy of virtually all 
national parties except the conservative ones. It worth mentioning that separation is 
not the only plausible option, although it is surely counted among the range of 
possibilities, but also federalism and a higher degree of autonomy are widely 
supported alternatives. 
 
About Scottish Language Policies – 4.2.2 
The language issue also is also central in the Scottish case and a lot of 
comparisons with the Catalan case are possible. In Spain the traditional autonomies 
already have a high degree of self-government after a long era of suppression; 
nevertheless they continue to press on the matter in order to embed the linguistic 
policies within the frame of the institutions. A great example of this is represented by 
the normalització lingüística in Catalonia. 
After the referendum on devolution in the UK in 1979, there was an upsurge of 
interest in Scottish culture, which included a higher interest in the Gaelic language. It 
is important to remember that Scotland has two indigenous languages: Scottish 
Gaelic and Scots. Gaelic was brought into Scotland by settlers from Ulster and, to a 
certain extent, it is linguistically close to Irish Gaelic, but different in its spelling. 
Scots, also known as lowland Scots and Lallans, developed from the northern form 
of Anglian brought by the Northumbrian settlers into South-West of Scotland. Both 
languages developed into their present forms in Scotland, which surely makes them 
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indigenous and disposes of any attempts to dismiss them as a mere dialect (Grand 
and Docherty, 1992). 
Grand and Docherty also point out that what is happening in Catalonia is 
raising interest in the Scottish context as well: the regaining autonomy process and 
the subsequent successful re-establishment of Catalan language. In the past being 
bilingual in Scotland (and I would argue here in many other countries with 
indigenous languages who are not officially recognised) used to be perceived as 
something negative, however in the last decades the perception of being bilingual 
changed. In other words the renewed importance given to regional languages, 
Catalan in Catalonia and Scottish Gaelic in Scotland, is a sign of the change in the 
perception of the bilinguism itself.  Since the 1960s much linguistic research has 
abandoned the pejorative model of bilinguism in favour of more positive attitude 
towards the matter which emphasises the advantages of being bilingual, or even 
trilingual and such (Grand and Docherty, 1992). In Scotland, people with even some 
knowledge of Gaelic are now more inclined to exaggerate it rather than conceal it, as 
it became part of the national heritage. However, the same attitude cannot be applied 
to Scots, which is not perceived in a positive way. As the authors explain Scots is 
stigmatised as bad English or just insolence, and giving a whole speech, or a lecture, 
in Scots would be regarded as ignorant or cranky. Its use in school is highly 
discouraged and despite the fact a Scots accent when speaking English is acceptable, 
the same reasoning does not apply to the use of Scots grammar nor vocabulary. 
National, and linguistic, minorities often take great encouragement from the 
success of other minorities elsewhere, as it is the case between Scotland and 
Catalonia. Despite of this attitude, it is important to keep in consideration the fact 
that special factors are typical of each single case and generalisations are hard to be 
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made. Comparisons of the other hand are useful to enlighten some key elements of 
the various movements.  
The authors underline three aspects which differ from the two cases. The first 
difference is from an economic perspective, as Catalonia is considered as a pole of 
attraction because of its status of economic and business hub. The same 
considerations do not apply to Scotland, which is suffering from depopulation 
because of the number of Scottish citizens who emigrate abroad, or within UK but 
outside of Scotland, because of work or other factors. 
The second difference is more political. Catalonia is more autonomous and 
better organized than Scotland, and this can only simplify the implementation of 
regional policies. Catalonia’s level of self-government is more embedded in the 
society and the regional government, the Generalitat, has been pursuing a large 
number of policies that help developing more self-government. Given the fact this 
trend started much before than in Scotland, Catalonia is enjoying part of the profits 
of its long term policies. 
The third point touches linguistic aspects. The current status of Catalan 
language in Catalonia is tightly associated to Catalan identity and its use is highly 
promoted by the Generalitat. Catalan can be virtually used in every aspect of life, 
spacing from education to more legal and bureaucratic areas. Scottish Gaelic is 
undoubtedly part of Scottish heritage and an important characteristic of Scottish 
separatism, but its daily use and institutionalisation is far from being efficiently 
implemented. 
 
Recent Debates and Media Coverage – 4.2.3 
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Still, the debates over Scotland’s separatism are all over the media, and some 
articles be now discussed. Elliot Bulmer18 comments on how the Scottish referendum 
of independence is more about popular sovereignty rather that personal identity. He 
criticises the emphasis posed on identity and he counterattacks explaining how most 
Scots identify as British and Scottish, and the coming referendum is not a choice 
between these identities as an independent Scotland would still, from a cultural and 
geographical perspective, be British. What is at stake is not identity per se, but rather 
the type of democracy, either codified in the principle of popular sovereignty or in 
parliamentary sovereignty. He argues that central government offers only a territorial 
compromise which is based on an unreformed electoral system and House of Lords, 
crown prerogatives, and repeal of the Human Rights Act.  
On the other hand the Scottish government is offering a real constitution that 
will establish an independent democracy fit for the 21st century19. Alex Salmond, the 
Scottish leader, has set Sept. 18, 2014, as the official date for an independence 
referendum that could radically alter the shape of the United Kingdom20. Needless to 
say, there is a lot of media supporting or rejecting the referendum that are widely 
available. The Scottish government has provided its citizens with a specific 
webpage 21  rich with information regarding the upcoming referendum, but it is 
                                                           
18 Bulmer, Elliot. “The Scottish referendum is about popular sovereignty, not identity”. The Guardian. 
Last retrieved on April 6th 2013 from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/mar/31/scotland-referendum-sovereignty-
identity-bogdanor 
19 Ibid. 
20 “Scotland Independence Vote: Referendum Date Set For Sept. 18, 2014”, The Huffington Post. Last 
retrieved on April 7th 2013 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/scotland-
independence-vote-referendum-date_n_2924557.html 
21 Official Site of the Referendum sponsored by the Scottish Government. Last retrived on April 7th 
2013 from http://www.scotreferendum.com/ 
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possible to find a lot of unofficial pages, both on private websites as well as in 
networking media, both pro22 and against23 the secession. 
Prime Minister Cameron’s declarations are, of course, against the separation of 
Scotland. It would be rather unexpected to hear anything different from the 
representative of the country from which Scotland would separate. Despite of this 
obvious attitude towards the separation, Cameron’s attitude towards the issue is by 
far different than the Spanish’s policy to the Catalan separatism. Cameron do not 
classify the possible separation of Scotland as something impossible and somehow 
illegal, but on the contrary he has no problems in stating how Scotland could surely 
stand on its own and become a separate nation. His way of tackling the problem is 
whether or not, Scotland would be better off inside of the United Kingdom. Cameron 
stated how Scotland within the UK already has a system of government that offers 
the best of both worlds so he does not see the gain in swapping the Scottish MPs, 
Scottish cabinet ministers and Scots throughout UK institutions, for one Scottish 
ambassador in London, as he puts it. He also criticises the fact that those who seek 
independence already discussed a separation transition plan, and even proposed a 
tentative date for this in 2016, in case the referendum were to be uccessful. Cameron 
argued that this final transition should not be discussed until all the facts have been 
aired24.  
In conclusion, Giles Tremlett commented on the growing affinity between the 
Catalan and the Scottish national movements, how Europe is facing an 
unprecedented attempt by two regions to separate from their countries in order to 
                                                           
22 Pro Separation webpage. Last retrived on April 7th 2013 from http://www.yesscotland.net/ 
23 Facebook page against the secession. Last retrived on April 7th 2013 from 
https://www.facebook.com/BritishUnity 
24 “Scottish Independence Referendum: Cameron Insists Scotland 'Better Off In Britain’ ”. The 
Huffington Post UK. Last retrieved on April 7th from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/02/10/scottish-independence-cameron-
referendum_n_2655567.html 
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become new states in 2014. It is interesting to notice how both movements chose the 
same year to have their referendums on independence. The domino effect can be felt 
already as Iñigo Urkullu, regional prime minister of the Basque Country, will also 
need the support of the separatist in order to assure a stable political coalition and he 
is surely expected to keep in consideration the events in Catalonia and Scotland 
before deciding whether to push for independence25. 
 
Trieste – 4.3 
The last study case presented is very different from the previous ones and will 
deal with the city, and the annexed territories, of Trieste, located in the northeast of 
Italy in proximity to the border with Slovenia. The section will tackle the historical 
past of Trieste, as well as the legal issues regarding its creation and its present status. 
It then discusses some of the modern problems and happenings at the present time 
which concern the pursuit of greater autonomy, broadly defined. 
In order to draw a continuum between the theoretical chapter and the case 
study of Trieste, it is important to point out how, despite the structural differences of 
this movement, Trieste presents historical and legal claims to its independence, as 
well as economic interests. The difference between this case and the previous one is 
represented by the different importance given to one characteristic or another. In 
Catalonia and Scotland the historical claims is one of the variables taken into 
consideration and although it plays an important role, other variables are also 
important. In the case of Trieste the historical, and more specifically legal, claims 
fulfil the most important role and are crucial to understanding the case study.  
                                                           
25 Tremlett, Giles. “Catalonia joins Scotland in push for 2014 independence vote”. The Guardian. Last 
retrived on April 7th 2013 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/13/catalonia-
independence-2014  
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These differences cause the Trieste case to move away from the previous ones, 
but only to a certain extent. Because of this difference, this case was chosen to be 
presented more in-depth in order to show how cases which place emphasis on 
different variables can be grouped together for the purpose of this research. 
 
Hints of the History of Trieste – 4.3.1 
Before engaging in the legal status of Trieste, however, it is worth present a 
brief historical introduction to the city.26  Trieste was one of the oldest parts of 
the Habsburg Monarchy from 1382 until 1918. During the XIX century, it was one 
of the most important harbours of one of the Great Powers of Europe: hence Trieste 
easily became the fourth largest city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the end of 
the century it emerged as an important hub for literature and music and it had a 
diversified population in terms of different nationalities. It is worth underlining how 
in those times the city expands in population and large insurance and shipping 
companies began to appear opening shipyards and factories.  
This migration gave rise to a multi-ethnic community unseen in the rest of 
Europe. Numerous religions and corresponding places of worship were welcomed to 
the area. Trieste became an important port and trade hub in the XVII and XVIII 
centuries when Emperor Charles VI declared the city a duty and tax-free port. The 
reign of his successor, Maria Theresa of Austria, inaugurated the beginning of a 
flourishing era. The construction of a deeper port made Trieste the only sea port of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and this fact led to the influx of merchants from all 
over the Mediterranean and the surroundings regions. Another important factor must 
be taken in consideration: Maria Teresa's policy of religious tolerance allowed the 
                                                           
26
 Botteri, Guido. “The Free Territory of Trieste: a European history of free trading and shipping”. 
Editoriale (1988). 
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different religious communities to practice openly and live together while practicing 
their own faith. Unger (1947) explains how Trieste’s economic position is highly 
dependent on the free movements of goods in world trade. He also draws attention 
on how any possible trend towards nationalism, that would diminish Trieste’s 
international and multicultural character, cannot but decrease its economy. In 
addition to this he stresses the natural economic advantages of Trieste represented by 
its geographical position as a gateway to Europe. If amicable political conditions 
were to be present, Unger stresses how the level of free trade could be restored to the 
conditions precedent to the World War, so that citizens of the territory of Trieste 
could benefit from their position and enjoy good standards of living. 
The city’s history did include periods of unpleasantness, however. The city 
was occupied by French troops three times during the Napoleonic Wars, respectively 
in 1787, 1805 and 1809. In the latter occasion Napoleon annexed the city to the 
Illyrian Provinces. During this period Trieste lost its autonomy and the status of free 
port was interrupted. Following the Napoleonic Wars, Trieste returned to the 
Austrian Empire in 1813 and continued to prosper as the "Imperial Free City of 
Trieste" (Reichsunmittelbare Stadt Triest). It became the capital of the Austrian 
Littoral region, the so-called "Kustenland". The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 
brought the city closer to the Indies and the Far East and this fact was extremely 
positive for the commerce and the development of economic and cultural activities. 
The modern Austro-Hungarian navy used Trieste as a military base as well as for its 
shipbuilding sites. The construction of the first major trunk railway in the Empire, 
the Vienna-Trieste Austrian Southern Railway, was completed in 1857, and was a 
valuable asset for trade and the supply of coal. However, the collapse of the Austro-
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Hungarian Empire and Trieste's union to Italy after World War I led to some decline 
of its "Mittel-European" cultural and commercial importance. 
This brief excursus through Trieste’s history shows how the city constituted an 
area famous for its multiculturalism, and which made great use of its location. 
Trieste always benefitted from a high degree on autonomy, and made of the port 
revenues one of its most economic and social incomes. Despite of its past, Trieste at 
the present time does not enjoy the same level of autonomy it used to have. 
 
Legal aspects related to the creation of Trieste and to its current state – 4.3.2 
In order to understand the issue regarding Trieste, it is important to analyse the 
treaties related to the creation and subsequent modifications of the territory of 
Trieste, in addition to the history described above  
The Security Council, with Resolution N°16 of the United Nations, stated the 
approval of the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste emphasizing its approval of 
three documents: the Instrument for the Provisional Regime of the Free Territory of 
Trieste; the Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste; and the Instrument 
for the Free Port of Trieste. The Treaty of Peace with Italy in 1947 carefully defined 
and delimitated the boundaries between the new state and its neighbour countries:27 
Italy and the former Republic of Yugoslavia (the present day Slovenia and 
Croatia)28. In doing so it stated the termination of the sovereignty of both countries in 
favour of the Free Territories and it bounded the maintenance of the integrity and 
independence of the new State with the United Nation. Resolution N°16 of the 
United Nation certifies how the Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste 
became the most important document used to define and shape the new territory and 
                                                           
27 Treaty of Peace with Italy (February, 10th 1947), Section I, Article 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 11 – 22. 
28 Treaty of Peace with Italy (February, 10th 1947), Section III, Article 21 – 22. 
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it contains very specific instructions regarding all different matters related to the 
territory—from economic to civic issues.  
As previously mentioned, this study case is different from the others as it can 
be regarded more of an institutional failure of autonomy or secession in its 
realisation. In other words Trieste potentially possesses a set of laws and a statute 
that would allow the territories to be independent, but these laws do not match with 
reality. While the two previous study cases revolve around political forces trying to 
obtain more self-government, through the creation of laws and the implementation of 
their legal rights, Trieste’s case is exactly the opposite. The set of laws are already 
present but not applied, hence the push is for the application of international law, 
rather than the creation of new norms. At the present time the vast majority of the 
provisions and decisions enumerated throughout the whole Statute had never been 
efficiently ratified and that the present status of Trieste is by far different from how 
the Statute, as well as the Treaty, aimed to be. The subsequent historical events, as 
well as the treaties that followed, pushed Trieste in its current state. Why this is so is 
explained next.  
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in London on October 5, 1954 
by the United Kingdom, United States, the Former State of Yugoslavia, and Italy. It 
is important to acknowledge at first that the quoted above Memorandum cannot be 
regarded as an international treaty but a simple Letter of Intent signed by the four 
nations mentioned, given the fact that the Memorandum was communicated and 
recorded by the United Nation on 25 April 1956 but it was never ratified nor 
approved by the Security Council. The Committee of the Free Territory of Trieste29 
argued that the Memorandum was an attempt in trying to nullify the 16th Resolution 
                                                           
29 Official Internet Site of the Free Committee of the Free Territory of Trieste. Last retrieved May 27th  
from http://www.triestfreeport.org/ 
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emanated by the Security Council of the United Nations on 10 January 1947 which 
was voted with 10 nations in favour and one nation abstained. On the basis of 
International Law an international treaty like the Treaty of Peace with Italy, which 
was voted and recorded, could be amended or cancelled only with the consent of a 
majority of States of the United Nations willing modify or abrogate it. In addition to 
this, a nation recognized by the Security Council of the UN as the Free Territory 
including the Free Port of Trieste, with Resolution n°16 of the Security Council, and 
under the constant responsibility of the latter (as defined in the Treaty of Peace or in 
the Permanent Statute) can not be modified, in any of its parts, neither its sovereignty 
could be legally put aside permanently of for a specified period of time. 
Once again attention is drawn upon the Permanent Statute whose boundaries 
have the priority on any subsequent modification. According to the Memorandum 
“The Italian and Yugoslav Governments will forthwith extend their civil 
administration over the area for which they will have responsibility." This extension 
of administration enacted by any state different from the Free Territory can be 
regarded as an illegal action according to the violation of the Permanent Statute. 
Another interesting aspect is related to more ethnic matters: the  extension of Both of 
Italy’s and the former State of Yugoslavia’s administrative control over the Free 
Territory triggered another exodus of population to one area or another, as well as 
abroad. Purini (2010) describes how the multiethnic Free Territory of Trieste, 
already oppressed by the ethnic cleansing during the fascist period, experienced a 
horrible example of violence and impositions such as the prohibition of residents to 
speak their mother tongue, the Italianization of family names on the one hand and the 
adaptation to Slavic language on the other. The Memorandum was the first real 
occupation of the Territory, according to the committee, by Italy and Yugoslavia. 
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The situation became more intricate during the Cold War since the two countries 
were on separate sides of the “wall” because of their ideological and political 
associations.  
In addition, it is also worth mentioning the Treaty of Osimo was signed in 
Osimo, in the province of Ancona (Italy), on November 10, 1975. According to the 
Committee of the Free Port of Trieste this Treaty can be considered fundamentally 
based upon the Memorandum of Understanding of 1954 and constituted an attempt 
by Yugoslavia and Italy to extend their control of the Free Territory by incrementing 
their influence on the Territory. The same reasoning applied to the Memorandum of 
Understanding works smilingly for this aspect. Italy and Yugoslavia could legally 
modify the boundaries between them (a case could be the city of Gorizia); since they 
are legally allowed to do that on the basis of a bilateral agreement; but this situation 
does not apply in the case of the modification of the boundaries of another nation. 
Given the fact that the Free Territory is neither Italy nor Yugoslavia, in order to take 
possession of this territory, and then there would have been the need of a proposal to 
the UN Security Council. This is due to the fact that the Free Territory of Trieste and 
the Free Port of Trieste are recognized by the United Nations30 , and also because the 
Security Council itself vouches for the territorial integrity, neutrality and 
demilitarization of this confederation of two States.31 
The situation at the present day has not improved. The vast majority, if not the 
totality, of the provisions and peculiar characteristics granted to the Free Territory by 
International law have not been implemented and are active at the present day. 
Anybody who is just visiting Trieste could easily notice that the Free Territory does 
not possess an independent currency for example, or no citizen of the Free Territory 
                                                           
30 Resolution N°16 of the UN Security Council on 10th January 1947. 
31 Peace Treaty with Italy, art. 21, and Permanent Statute of the FTT, Annex VI, articles 1 to 3. 
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is entitled of any passport different from the Italian, the Slovenian or the Croatian 
one, according to one’s rights. This is because Trieste, at the present time, is a 
province of Italy, part of the region of Friuli Venezia Giulia32, one of Italy’s twenty 
counties. 
 
Recent Debates and Media Coverage – 4.3.3 
Trieste Libera is the most active group who claims the UN resolution 
regarding Trieste to be respected, ratified and implemented. The movement harshly 
criticises the fact that Trieste is now included in the territories of Italy, hence under 
its political, economic and legal jurisdiction. Furthermore the movement does not 
recognise Italian political elections valid in the territory of Trieste and incites people 
to refuse the electoral cards, by stating how they do not recognise the sovereignty of 
Italy over Trieste. In addition to this the movement focuses on all aspects regarding 
the abuse of the port of Trieste by Italian Authorities.  
One of the main issues at the present time is the administration of the port of 
Trieste. The Committee of the Free Port of Trieste, as well as Greenaction 
Transnational33 , condemns and denounces the present status of the Free Port of 
Trieste and the continuous attempts of the Italian Government, as well as all its 
administrative bodies, to illegally suspend the sovereignty of the Free Territory. The 
dispute between the two parties, respectively the Free Territory and the Italian 
Government, revolves around the suspension of the free trade zone and the 
possibility of allowing the construction of residential and commercial buildings in 
the Free Territory. The Greenaction Transnational evaluated this possible series of 
                                                           
32 Official site of the region of Friuli Venezia Giulia. Last retrived May 11th 2013 from 
http://www.regione.fvg.it/rafvg/cms/RAFVG/ 
33 Giurastante, Roberto. Trieste: un Porto Internazionale sotto assedio Italiano. 
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investments as much as 2 billions of euro and a lot of interests of private and public 
actors. However the Free Territory cannot be subjected to the judgement of foreign 
entities (Italy in this case), and in addition to this all the proceeds granted by the Free 
Port should not be administrated by the Italian Government but, much to the 
contrary, should be reinvested in the area of the Free Territory. 
The first of many cases that can be analyzed is the recent suspension of the 
Free zone in the Porto Vecchio (Old Port) to allow the art exhibition “Biennale 
diffusa” to take place. The suspension took place between the 20 June 2011 until 30 
November 2011. The Commissioner of the Government Alessandro Giacchetti 
signed the act to that effect. The Committee underlined how it is important to notice 
that the Instrument for the FPT (Annex VIII) doesn’t contain any article forbidding 
either art exhibitions or access to the international territory, hence this illegal 
suspension by the Italian Government can be regarded as a mere excuse to 
compromise the sovereignty of the Free Port. The entrance of visitors in the Free 
Port had been a violation of the article 11 of the Annex VIII Instrument for the FPT 
because the people visiting an art exhibition were not “engaged in any legitimate 
pursuit in the Free Port area”. However, the Committee commented that it would had 
been enough for visitors to get a temporary pass at the entrance to the FPT that 
allows them to see the art exhibition for one day, hence there was no need to suspend 
the sovereignty of the Free Port. More specifically the suspension violates article 2 
of the Annex VIII since it violates the concept of territorial sovereignty of the Free 
Port considering that it must function “in accordance with the provisions of this 
Instrument”. In addition to this, Italy took back possession of the infrastructures 
(because of the art exhibition) which have been passed to the Free Territory, and 
consequently to the Free Port, so this is a serious violation of the Peace Treaty with 
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Italy, ratified by Italy on 15 September 1947. Furthermore The Italian act of 
suspension of the Instrument for the FPT is de facto an illegal appropriation of the 
international territory of the Free Territory, since it practically confiscates the port 
boundaries as they were in 1939 and establishes an area under Italian jurisdiction 
within the statutory boundaries of the Free Territory, according to the Committee for 
the Free Port.  
This episode34 can be regarded as one of the many possible trends followed by 
the major Italian Institutions about matters related to the Free Port. Paolo G. Parovel 
denounced the situation with his articles on the newspaper, La Voce di Trieste, 
emphasizing the relationship between interests and high powers of the Italian 
Government, through its institutions in the area. This state of things is extremely 
detrimental to the citizens of the Free Territory whose rights are constantly denied. 
There are several legal proceedings regarding the state of things and the 
continuous violation of the law. One that was particular successful was the judicial 
inquiry related to the public exposure presented by the A.L.I. (Associazione Libera 
Informazione), a cultural association based in Trieste which deals with the freedom 
of information, to the pertinent institutions. The inquiry was divided into two bills of 
instrument: the first one summed up and denounced the numerous illegalities that 
have been put in act in the Free Territory. Despite of the accuracy of the document 
the commissioner of the government stated that he could not express any legal 
consideration on the topic since there was a problem of jurisdiction: according to him 
the issue fell into ministerial jurisdiction. The second bill of instrument was a short 
transmission document to the public prosecutor’s office regarding the accusation of 
collusion by many organs and institution of the area of Trieste. In addition to this an 
                                                           
34 Parovel, G. Paolo. Porto Franco Trieste: i testi dell’inchiesta-denuncia a Prefetto e Commissario del Governo 
ed alle Procure. 
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appeal has been submitted to the competent authorities by Crismani Group regarding 
the denial of the renewal of their work contract without a solid and documented 
motivation. All the proceedings quoted above are consistent with the recent verdicts 
of the legal court of Trieste and of the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale 
(Regional Administrative Court) of the Region Lazio in stating that the Free Port can 
only be intended as an International Free Trade Zone, hence it is not possible to 
construct any building whose final purpose is different from that, and that this 
characteristic is an inviolable and exclusive of the Free Port according to the 
international role adopted by Italy with the Treaty of 1954 and 1975. As previously 
discussed these treaties are considered null and void by the Free Committee; 
however the proceedings discussed above have been emanated by Italian institutions 
that recognize the two Treaties. Parovel draws connections 35  between these 
illegalities related to a case of property speculation and to a case of cover-up by the 
different authorities that should analyze the facts and condemn the speculation. 
It is important to note a crucial difference between Trieste’s movements and 
Catalonia’s or Scotland’s. The opposition in the last two cases is represented by the 
regional government, as well as regional political parties, against the central 
government. This cannot be the case in Trieste, as the regional government is part of 
Italy, hence the opposition is formed mostly by NGOs and intellectuals. The most 
important movements is represented by Trieste Libera36. This movement represents 
as the main actor in pursuing the interest of the territory of Trieste and stands as the 
promoter of the secession and it can be regarded as an umbrella that welcomes 
supporters from very different areas. It is also interesting to mention that Trieste 
                                                           
35 Parovel, G. Paolo. Perché il “riuso del porto vecchio” di Trieste è invece una colossale truffa immobiliare 
guidata da una 'cupola' politico-speculativa. 
36 Official Site of the Movement Trieste Libera. Last retrieved May 11th 2013 from 
http://triestelibera.org/it/ 
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Libera is proud to define itself as an apolitical movement that will not take part in 
regional elections, because they do not recognise any election coming from Italy as 
legal, given the fact that there is a problem of disputed sovereignty over the territory.  
The case of Trieste stands different than Catalonia and Scotland, but it is 
interesting to see how the variety of cases are part of a very broad spectrum and 
different historical and social causes can push for a desire of more self-government.  
This fourth chapter discussed three case studies that show how the new wave 
or regionalism is effecting modern politics. The cases, in their respective different 
countries, are compared in the measure in which the possible solutions of their issues 
represent serious challenges to their respective governments.  
The next chapter will wrap up the discussion by presenting some 
considerations about the findings on the similarities, and differences, between the 
political parties and movements that are part of the modern political arena. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Final Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Before getting into the core of chapter V, it is best to briefly summarise what 
has been discussed in the previous chapters. The first chapter introduced the 
arguments and the research questions regarding autonomy and secessionist 
movements, and it also presented information on how the data considered for this 
thesis have been gathered, studied and analysed. The second chapter focussed on the 
academic work that already has been done on the topic, by tackling each of the 
characteristics that were researched and studied within the separatist political parties 
and movements. Regionalism, ethnicity, regional nationalism, minority languages 
and regional economies are some of the topics that are discussed in chapter two. 
Chapter three provided the reader with a quick overview of the regional movements 
that are part of the European political panorama, specifying the parameters used to 
create the chart presented in the chapter. The fourth chapter discusses three study 
cases taken from the chart: two of them, Catalonia and Scotland, can be regarded as 
exemplar cases while the third, Trieste, represents a case that stands out from the 
norm.  
This last chapter will try to analyse and discuss the data collected, while trying 
to emphasise aspects of interest for the purpose of this research. The chapter will 
present a series of considerations that, for a matter of classifications, could be 
grouped according to the main issues they deal with. The first group will tackle 
geographical and geomorphologic characteristics; the second group will deal with 
the role of language in defining regional nationalism and backing up regional 
movements; the following part will focus on the importance of the relationship 
between the modern movements and history; the fourth part will engage the crucial 
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issues of economics, and the last group will include an example of how the lack of 
the previous characteristics listed above can be used to exclude other potential 
secessionist regions because of the lack of specific features. 
The research questions introduced in the first chapter seek to find common 
characteristics among the different secessionist movements present within Europe. 
The theoretical chapter presented some general characteristics that are somehow 
present, in different degrees and details, in all the movements and some of these will 
be discussed according to the data gathered in chapter three. 
The first factor to be discussed concerns the impact that geographic and 
geomorphologic characteristics have on the movements. Despite the fact that one 
could be persuaded to think that all the aspects revolving around secessionist 
movements are artificial and social, it is important not to forget that natural 
environment and location do play a role. By the term geographical characteristic I 
refer to both natural boundaries and location, as well as to the artificial boundaries of 
the different countries. 
As a general observation, it is possible to notice how distance and isolation 
seem to trigger a higher need for self-government. Being isolated or far from the 
centre of political and economic power presents several extra costs and difficulties 
which complicate the relationship between centre and periphery. Especially in those 
cases when the territory of a country is extensively stretched between different world 
zones, the various regions will have different needs from each other and because of 
this they have the necessity of specific policies to tackle their problems. If the central 
government does not recognize nor invest in sustainable solutions for the problems 
its periphery, it will be likely to foment autonomous and secessionist desires.  
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Hechter (1992) states how regions that have unique economic specialisations 
and cultural compositions possess higher chances to develop secessionist 
movements, and when both of these variables are present at the same time the 
chances increase exponentially. Geography does play a role in granting specific 
natural resources to some areas and not to others: an island will gain access to the 
sea, to maritime commerce and perhaps to tourism. At the same time it is possible to 
say that territories that are isolated or far from the central government will likely to 
have distinct cultural traits as well.  
These considerations become even more noticeable when dealing with islands 
and very isolated territories. It is possible to notice that a lot of the movements 
contained in the chart are located in very isolated locations and islands, both in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Balearic Islands) as well as in the 
Atlantic Ocean and Baltic Sea (Faeroe Islands, Greenland, Aland Islands, Canary 
Islands, Madeira and Azores). 
Other interesting observations can be made about the fact that a lot of areas 
with more autonomy or with secessionist movements are placed along the borders of 
a country. Historical modification of borders tend to be characterised by divisions 
that do not keep in consideration the population that lives in the areas adjacent to the 
borders, this causes discontent and can result in regional divisions. Modifications of 
borders happen for a variety of reasons that encompass historical events and treaties 
between countries, but despite the fact that such process is common to all countries, 
not only located in Europe, some cases are more unfortunate than others. Given the 
fact that not all the countries are characterised by separatist movements along their 
borders, each single case possesses unique characteristics that must be treated 
separately. There are cases in which the modification of borders has been successful 
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and kept in consideration the demographics on the areas interested, and in these 
cases the adjustment to the new borders was rather painless.  
It is possible to present some examples. In Belgium there is a small German-
speaking community 37  whose rights are recognised by the Belgian constitution, 
located in the areas right adjacent to the border with Germany, and their population 
is about 75 000 individuals. The German-speaking Community is a politically 
independent entity, a small state within the Belgian federal system and German is its 
administrative, legal and educational language. In Italy, all the five counties (Italy 
has twenty) that possess a certain amount of autonomy, the so called Regioni a 
Statuto Speciale (Counties with a Special Statute) are located on the borders or they 
are islands. What it is even more interesting is that all these counties have 
movements that ask for more self-government and in some cases even secession 
from the Italian state. Other good examples could be also represented by the small 
islands under the British government: the Isle of Man and the Isle of Wight. Despite 
their small populations, both of the islands enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and 
possess political parties that are defending the current amount of self-government 
and somehow pushing for more local autonomy. 
In other cases, political borders are not taken in consideration when defining 
political movements, as in the case of the Basque Country, whose political parties 
and representatives are present on both sides of the Pyrenees, respectively in Spain 
and France.  
The same reasoning applies for the Sami movement, located all across north 
Scandinavia and the neighbouring area of Russia. Given the fact the Sami can be 
considered as a stateless nation, each of the communities are bound to the law of the 
                                                           
37 Official Site of the German-speaking Community of Belgium. Last retrieved April 10th from 
http://www.dglive.be/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-1263/2264_read-27181/ 
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single state in which they reside, hence the regulations are not homogeneous across 
the different states. 
The second important aspect that cannot be ignored is language’s role in the 
separatist movements. As previously discussed, language policies are part of the 
political agenda of these movements, regardless of the nature of the language itself 
that is to be pushed in order to build up more national consciousness. This discourse 
applies to both minority languages, both those that are not recognised within the 
country in which they are spoken or those whose use have not been institutionalised 
nor implemented. 
As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the movements listed invest time and 
efforts in shaping language policies whose purpose is to recognise and implement the 
use of the minority language they claim, or to improve and maximise the resonance 
that an already recognised language has within the state, or at least within their 
region. There are many examples that could be briefly discussed. 
In Belgium the division between the French-speaking and the Flemish-
speaking community is rather strict, excluding the case of Brussels, and as far as 
linguistic policies are concerned, the two provinces act like two different entities, 
each defending and promoting its language. Belgium is also a clear example that 
language has a role in defining communities and movements since, as previously 
discussed, the German-speaking Community located along the border with Germany 
is structured and named according to their linguistic differences towards the majority 
of Belgian citizens. Similar considerations apply to the Swedish speaking minorities 
of Finland, located in the Åland Islands, and the Hungarian speaking communities of 
Romania. 
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In other cases, such as in the UK, the minority languages are officially 
recognised in most of the secessionist and autonomous regions, such as Scotland and 
Wales, but its implementation is not well structured and institutionalised as the 
dominant language is. This is why most of the nationalist movements in those 
regions always mention the language issue in order to promote the national regional 
culture while gathering more popular consensus. As previously mentioned in the 
case of Scotland, Scottish Gaelic has its official status but in daily life, English 
language acts as means of communication in virtually all possible situations. Despite 
of this, the separatist movement pushes for a major use of Gaelic and a higher degree 
of institutionalisation that will both mark a stricter separation between Scotland and 
the rest of UK, and will grow importance in shaping and defining what the Scottish 
Nation is willing to become. 
The institutionalisation of the language seems to be a key goal to national 
regional movements, hence institutionalisation oriented policies are extremely 
common and can vary in intensity and strategy according to the responses from the 
central government to which they are addressed to. Despite the crucial role they 
conduct in the cultural sector, their institutionalisation is probably the most desirable 
step towards a more official use of the language. Very successful policies were 
carried out in Catalonia and the tendency to provide more official and institutional 
grounds for the language to perfuse all aspects on daily life seem to be working by 
incrementing its use and number of active speakers. 
This discourse applies to both minority and official languages as there are 
cases in which regions of a country are characterised by a large number of speakers 
of a non official language in a specific area. This is the standard case with minority 
languages but there are other numerous cases in which it is not so.  
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A good example could be the region of Trentino Alto Adige38 in Italy, adjacent 
to Austria, which is commonly divided in two sub-regions, Trentino and Südtirol. 
The whole region is one of the five autonomous regions of Italy and the latter is 
famous for being more Austrian than Italian if considering the policies that apply in 
the area. Speaking the German language in Südtirol is essential for education, 
business and everyday life purposes and the national movements in that region 
always push for the use of German language in every aspect of life of their citizens. 
Some of the most extreme political parties opt for a secession of the northern region, 
Südtirol, with a subsequent union with Austria. 
A similar case can be found in Finland, more specifically in the Åland 
Islands 39 , an archipelago of islands part of the Finnish State but inhabited by 
Swedish speakers and whose official language is Swedish in all matters regarding 
public administration, education and bureaucracy. Even in this case the importance 
of the language is crucial to figure out the current situation of the Åland Islands, as 
strong historical claims are supported with the fact that the inhabitants on the islands 
speak Swedish and require self-government because of their different needs in 
contrast of the rest of the country. Identity issues are well represented here by the 
equation that links together Swedish language and Swedish identity: a lot of claims 
made by the separatist parties in the Islands are based on the fact that their 
inhabitants are Swedish and not Finnish, fact highly reinforced by the diffusion and 
implementation of Swedish language in the islands. This is not the only reason, as 
some may argue, but it surely is central and crucial in the debate. 
                                                           
38 Official Site of the Autonomous Region of Trentino Alto Adige. Last retrieved April 12th from 
http://www.regione.taa.it/ 
39 Official Site of the Aland Islands. Last retrieved April 12th from http://www.aland.ax/ 
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The third aspect deal with are historical grounds. History is often used by 
national movements try to add weight to their political agenda and in order to assure 
more authenticity to their claims. Historical characteristics of a specific region play 
an important role in the definition and shape of how the movement will assert its 
aims and goals and they encompass different types of happenings. The relationship 
between the central government, or former states, and the region of belonging is 
always important in providing a common ground for discussion and negotiations. 
When the region possess a certain amount of autonomy during its history, then it will 
be more likely that possible negotiations will occur with the central government and 
solutions to potential issues will be found in a pacific and constructive way.  
On the other hand, in the unlucky event in which relations between the region 
and the central government are unfriendly, if not hostile, secession may take place in 
pacific and, more commonly, aggressive terms. Once again it is important to 
remember that each case must be taken into analysis, but it is possible to generalise 
by saying that the history of relations of a region, in which a national regional 
movement is located and rooted, and its central government influence the separatist 
movement itself. This influence can be seen in radical aspects, or it can regards 
specific characteristics, but regardless of which of the two, a long past of repression 
or denial of the autonomous claims of a region is likely to cause relation problems in 
the future. When dealing with specific regional national movements, it is always 
important to understand on which historical grounds they are basing their claims on. 
Historical claims over a region also have a connection with nationalism. A lot 
of national regional movements claim rights over a specific region because their 
ancestors have historically inhabited that specific land for a considerable period of 
time. Many of the separatist movements place upon heritage and historical residence 
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over the region the claims that because a specific area was inhabited by generations, 
also at the present day some people have more right than others to decide about the 
future of that region. The fact that, for instance, the official national hymn of Wales 
is called old land of my fathers (Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau) is one of many examples of 
how modern nationalism draws from the Romantic tradition of passing the land to 
one’s children. Despite how this way of thinking could be regarded as irrational and 
over sentimental, it is still largely accepted and implied in the common culture and in 
the political arena. More problems arise when a specific region were inhabited by 
different peoples through time, especially when the transitions from one to another 
were bellicose or dictated by wars and colonisation. It is also important to notice that 
this attachment to the heritage of a specific land, or country, is not exclusive of 
regional movements, but it is accepted also by many countries which are 
internationally recognised. 
Lindeman (1941) discusses some of the motivations to regionalism and he 
relates it as a reaction to the increasing phenomenon of standardisation. He points 
out how this term is acquiring the connotation of uniformity, rather than unity, and 
how this ongoing process is perceived as negative by those individuals whose 
identities are imbedded in a regional culture. His discourse is related to the 
importance of historical roots of regionalism, since he discusses how the progressive 
loss in tradition is a peculiar characteristics present in many cases of regionalism. 
Tradition here is regarded as the intangible heritage transmitted through persons by 
means of shared experience and it stands as a form of historical ground on which 
regionalist claims are based on. From this perspective, regionalism can be regarded 
as a positive response to the dangers of uniformity, because it implies a wider and 
more functional participation of the individual. 
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A fourth important aspect discussed within separatist movements is economic 
characteristics. Some argued that economic issues are the real triggering reason for 
the demand of secession, while others may place more importance on the 
cultural/linguistic factors. Regardless of which of these characteristics better applies 
to single cases, the administration of taxes and fees is always a debated issue. 
Despite of a high degree of autonomy, when it comes to matters of taxation 
and more specifically of investments and funding of public projects, tensions with 
the central government inflame the debate over the control of the revenues. In most 
cases, the economic independence from the central government is the last portion of 
sovereignty (not) granted to autonomous region, and usually with a lot of limitations. 
Another variable is represented by the level of wealth of the region which is 
claiming more economic self-government. If the region that is seeking to expand its 
control over its territory is rather rich and wealthy and possesses resources or 
developed industry, then a total secession would allow a better allocation of the 
taxes. Catalonia would be a good example of this case, as it is one of the richest 
regions of Spain and Catalan nationals claim that a lot of investment in the public 
sector in various fields is not being processed by the central government because a 
lot of the taxes that comes from Catalonia are reinvested in other regions of Spain. 
Regardless of how correct a complain of this type would be, as a lot criticise the fact 
that it is normal for richer regions to aid poorer regions, this is used by the separatist 
movement to enlighten the importance of a possible economic independence. An 
independent Catalonia would have the total freedom to reinvest its taxes in 
whichever project they wish to. 
Does the same discourse apply to not so rich regions? Perhaps yes, but with 
some structural differences. Each case should be examined singularly although some 
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generalisations are possible. Regions that seek more self-government, and that can be 
regarded as under developed if compared to the average of a country, sometimes 
claim the central government guilty of the state of things. As previously discussed, a 
lot of the secessionist movements claim independence on the base that their territory 
have different needs, dictated by geography or the nature of resources present in the 
area. When a country chooses to make investment on a specific sector, which may be 
correct for most of its territories, but to some others it is highly inefficient, then those 
regions will become more and more undeveloped if compared to the rest. This 
creates a vicious circle where the poorer areas will get worse because of the 
decreasing investments dictated by the fact that those areas are not enough developed 
to attract investors. 
Another interesting fact is that the data shows how even a relatively small 
group of individuals, regardless of their proportion with the entire population of the 
country they reside in, can constitute a separatist movement or, in some cases, even a 
region. It is often the case that such movements are accused by central governments 
to constitute a very small part of the population, hence their scarce number makes 
them ignorable. Empirical data shows that, in more than one case, even very small 
regions are home for separatist movements. This of course does not mean that the 
total population of the area is pro-separation, but it still gives an idea of how 
numbers alone hardly ever constitute a good criterion. 
Many of the cases reported in the chart of chapter three, are constituted by a 
very small part of population. The German Speaking Community of Belgium is 
about 75 000 people; Corsica (France) has about 260 000 individuals;40 the Isle of 
                                                           
40Institut National de la Statistique et des étudies économiques. Last Retrieved April 12th from 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=6&ref_id=poptc02501 
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Wight’s (UK) population is about 135 000;41 and Valle d’Aosta (Italy) has about 128 
000 residents.42 Many other examples could be possible, but these are enough to give 
an idea of how sometimes the populations of regions who hosts separatist and 
nationalist movements can be quite small, if compared with the rest of the country 
they are inserted in. 
The characteristics discussed above can also be used to define what does not 
enter the categorization scheme that has been proposed in this research. As 
previously explained, defining what a separatist movement is constituted of can be 
done through the analysis of what specifics characteristics they possess, hence 
movements that do not fit with the model proposed in this analysis would not be 
considered as separatist movements, or as movements seeking more autonomy or 
self-government. Same reasoning applies to regions: a lot of areas listed on chapter 
three, were inserted in the chart because they abide to similar characteristics that 
were found on a variety of empirical movements. Once again it is important to 
remark that the chart in chapter three, and the analysis of the movements itself is not 
something that should be taken literally but it rather is more of a general guideline 
that highlight similar characteristics among political entities and organizations. 
Unfortunately there is not enough time to deepen each of the single element 
listed on the chart, despite the fact each of them possess specific peculiarities that 
distinguishes it from the others. 
A good example is represented by the Lega Nord movement located in the 
North of Italy which I would not define nor as a separatist movement nor as a 
                                                           
41 Isle of Wight population figures by area. Last retrieved April 12th 
fromhttp://www.wightonline.co.uk/islandinfo/population.html 
42 "Plurilinguisme administratif et scolaire en Vallée d’Aoste" in Rapport régional "Profil de la politique 
linguistique éducative", Assessorat à l’ Éducation et à la Culture du Département Surintendance aux 
Etudes de la Région Vallée d'Aoste, Aoste, février 2007 
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regional national movement, despite its presence in the chart. The Lega Nord 
movement defines itself as a secessionist movement whose main interests and 
concerns are the northern part of Italy itself, as opposed to central and southern Italy. 
Although its characteristics do not match with the ones discussed above, or they 
match only partially, the movement does have a huge impact on Italian politics and 
ignoring it would be like missing a puzzle from the Italian political panorama. To get 
more specific about why the political movement does not fit the characteristics 
discussed above, it is necessary to understand its claims and key points. La Lega 
Nord claims an area called Padania, which is rather a geographical area than a 
historical one. Padania defines the area located between the rivers Po’ and the Alps, 
which encompasses all the different regions in the area. The first thing to be noted is 
the lack of a historical common heritage, as the entire area described as Padania was 
never united in a Kingdom but it rather had a divided history between different city 
states and historical reigns. In addition to this, the definitions of what is defined as 
Padania (as well as its limits) are somehow vague and controversial. In addition to 
this, there are differences within the territory itself in terms of languages, and 
dialects, and single historical roots of the different region. What La Lega Nord is 
aiming to is more of a federal division of the northern regions of Italy, which would 
imply a change in the economic and civil administration of those areas. The key 
point here is that they auspicate this change in the so called Padania area, which they 
describe as a separate already existing entity, while I consider it rather a combination 
of some of the regions of North Italy. Despite the legitimacy and feasibility of their 
project, which is not the aim of the discussion here, their lack of common historical 
ground and language oriented goals emphasise how it is different from most, if not 
all, the other movements listed in chapter three. Agnew (1992) developed an 
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historical analysis of the movement stressing how it shifted from regional separatism 
to national populism based on the projection of northern political values. 
 
Conclusions – 5.1 
The research questions presented in the first chapter aimed to seek possible 
similarities and common denominators in the very diverse political panorama of 
separatist and secessionist movements in Europe. The research underlines how the 
large number of movements and political parties present in Europe can be ideally 
placed on a continuum of seeking different degrees of self-government, starting from 
mere autonomy to total secession from the country they reside in. Rather than being 
one or another, the vast majority of movements lie in the grey area between the two 
extremes, carrying differences in goals and political views. 
These shared  characteristics can be categorized as geographical, economic, 
linguistic, and historical, and are present in the vast majority of movements, even if 
specifications are necessary for each movement. Despite the differences, it is 
possible to generalise to a certain degree by paying attention to these different 
characteristics, to their presence (or absence) and to how they play a role in the 
single movement analysed. 
The timing of the last events is crucial, especially when considering the current 
state of the movements that is pushing for more autonomy and eventual separation. 
The case studies of Scotland and Catalonia exemplify how the next years will be 
important in understanding how far the new wave of regionalism is going, and how 
the possible future countries will be inserted in a European, but especially a worldly, 
context. 
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It is important to keep in consideration that secessionist movements, at one 
extreme of the spectrum discussed in the research, do not constitute that often and 
the cases in which such political movements do not succeed in their intents is more 
probable than a real secession. The research presented how different movements 
share similar characteristics, and it is important to remember that only movements 
present within the European Union were taking into account, but many others are 
present outside of these territories.  
Hechter (1992) engages with the topic of secessionism presenting the many 
difficulties on a real secession. According to the author few regions have structural 
requirements for the successful development of a secessionist movements, and those 
that do must be capable of developing a political apparatus capable of overcoming 
the many problems that arise in its realisation. 
This said, the host state is anything but powerless to protect its territorial 
integrity. There are characteristics that facilitate secession and states are aware of at 
least some of them. If, for instance, the secessionist region is large and somehow 
isolated, presenting natural geographic differences; and if the central government has 
few discretionary resources to provide the necessary incentives; and if constitutional 
reforms are either difficult to be enacted or regarded as insufficient and useless by 
the territorial population; then, and only then, the host state will be forced to 
contemplate according to secessionist demands. Hechter makes clear how the 
chances to have all these variable occurring at the same time is not likely to happen 
often, yet not impossible, as empirical cases have been showing. 
As a conclusive discussion, it is important to bring attention on the concept of 
self-determination, which is the legal and ideological basis on which all the 
movements’ claims presented above are grounded. 
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According to an article in The Yale Law Journal (1980) the doctrine of self-
determination has functioned primarily to facilitate the separation of colonial 
empires and to validate the norm of popular consent in the territory disposition. The 
article discusses how, historically speaking, the concept of self-determination 
drastically changed during time, and the concept that it is commonly taken for 
granted at the present times, and that has been discussed through this research and 
constitutes legal base for all separatist movements, emerged after the World War II. 
After World War I, the right of self-determination was granted to nationalities that 
had previously lacked political form, and it is possible to say that self-determination 
was intended as a political principle rather than a legal right. Because of this, self-
determination was applied only to historically recognised groups which were 
considered political entities. 
This drastically changed after World War II as the principle of self-
determination became a fundamental legal right included in the United Nation 
Charter. According to Article 21 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
will of the people constitutes the basis of government, hence individuals have the 
right to be governed by whichever entity they consider more appropriate. Self-
determination became a concept of group expression and consensual government  
Secessionist demands encounter problems similar to citizen allegiance, 
boundary demarcation and resource distribution, all faced by previous self-
determination claims. The difference lies in the greater focus between change and 
stability at a more explicit and heretofore unacceptable level (The Yale Law Journal, 
1980). In addition to the problems discussed above, the self-determination principle 
clashes with the principle of state sovereignty over a certain territory, and the 
participation of outside actors further complicates the equation. 
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Many questions are still open for different interpretations and represent 
important issues related to the future of the political status quo of the European 
Union and of the reaction of those secessionist movements that have not bloomed 
yet. A possible domino effect is auspicious, given the resonance of the happenings in 
Scotland and Catalonia, yet each region possess different characteristics that could 
change the final outcome. Regardless of what this outcome will be, it will pose 
serious challenges to both single countries and to the European Union itself.  
Why this new wave of regionalism is taking place in this precise moment in 
time surely requires further research. This thesis highlighted a number of 
characteristics but did not want to provide an answer to the timing variable, 
focussing more on the nature of the movements and on characteristics that are 
recurrent in this new wave of regionalism. 
Another interesting research topic that was not addressed in this research is the 
role of the European Union in the regional context. Many different scenarios are 
possible as the European Union could play a rather active role by supporting, or 
containing, regional claims, but this would rather create clashes with the principle of 
non-intervention on the single countries regional politics. The position on the EU on 
this topic is not clear, but future happenings, such as the referendum for 
independence of Scotland and Catalonia will be likely to force the EU to take a 
position on the matter, especially on the issue related to the possible joining to the 
EU of new born states, if the referendum were to be successful.  
These unanswered issues, along with many others, are left for future research 
on the topic, hoping that more importance will be given to the rising topic of regional 
politics. 
Time will unveil what the many regions of Europe are yet to become. 
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